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I. INTRODUCTION

Trademark law 1 has regularly been viewed through a First
Amendment lens. 2 As the trademark has distanced itself from the
good, both physically and conceptually, the communicative aspects
of the trademark have moved to the forefront. Competitors use
others' trademarks to convey information to the consumer either
textually ("smells like Chanel but is less expensive") or visually
(packaging the store-brand shampoo in the same type of bottle as
the name-brand shampoo). Trademarks have become part of our
vocabulary-we talk of"not wanting simply to put a Band-Aid on a
situation" or about something being "the Rolls Royce of its class. "3
Appropriation artists use trademarks to make statements about the
trademark holder or the corporate form more generally. 4 The effect
that restrictions on these kinds of trademark uses can have on
discourse is justly of concern to commentators, for there is risk to
efficient and important speech when trademark owners are allowed
to control uses of their marks beyond those that are likely to cause
confusion as to source.
Each of these events involves an entity other than the trademark
holder engaging in the actofusingthe trademark to speak to others.
But there is, of course, a prior instance of trademark speech: the
initial communication between producer and consumer. In this

1
Throughout this Article, I use the term "trademark law" in its broad sense to
encompass trade dress and unfair competition law (i.e., for unregistered marks) and to apply
to marks for goods as well as services.
2
See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN.
L. REV. 1095, 1137 (2003) (noting that federal and state trademark laws are subject to
scrutiny under First Amendment).
3
See Alex Kozinski, Essay, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-73
(1993) (noting role that trademarks serve in public discourse); see also Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 195-96 ("Famous trademarks offer a
particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of their owners, and thus become an
important, perhaps at times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary."); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 397, 397 (1990) ("Some trademarks have worked their way into the English
language; others provide bases for vibrant, evocative metaphors.").
• See Sonia K Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience , 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 489, 493-95 (2006)
(describing trend of modern artists and activists who appropriate corporate logos and symbols
to make artistic, social, and political statements).
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conversation, the trademark holder uses the trademark as a
shorthand to convey two separate but related concepts to the
consumer: a statement that reduces search costs ("here is the
product you want") and a summary of the messages previously or
simultaneously conveyed through advertising ("here is why you
want it"). Barton Beebe labels these concepts as the "search" aspect
of the mark and the "persuasion" aspect of the mark. 5 These two
functions of the mark underlie the Supreme Court's statement in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. justifying trademark
protection on the grounds that trademark law both "reduce[s] the
customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions" and
ensures that producers "reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product. "6
As the recipient of these messages, the consumer is an important
part of the dialogue. Indeed, trademarks require, at least to some
extent, an active consumer to negotiate with these dual
messages--one who not only perceives the trademark as a source
identifier but who also can call to mind (and then accept or reject)
the various associations the mark comprises. Indeed, as I have
noted elsewhere, 7 trademark law relies on the consumer's ability to
engage in this sort of associational dexterity. It assumes that

5
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 2020, 2025-26 (2005); see also RalphS. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest:
Legal Protection ofTrade Symbols , 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185-91 (1948) (distinguishing between
"informative" and "persuasive" functions of trademarks). Justice Frankfurter famously made
much the same point:
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The
owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the
same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers,
the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
6
514 U .S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(holding that color alone can serve trademark function).
7
See Laura A. Heymann, Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Professor
Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 220 (2007) ("[T]rademark law actually places a fair
amount of trust and confidence in consumers to manage competing associations and negotiate
among various meanings attached to the same words or phrases. It requires them not only
to make and remember the association between the trademark and the product or producer
but also to distinguish that mental link from others using the same or a similar mark.").
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consumers will see a graphic "swoosh" and recall, without any other
assistance, that the symbol is associated with Nike; that the
statement "I'm going from D.C. to New York on Delta" will not
involve the use of a kitchen faucet; and that despite the absence of
the word "car" in the sentence "I traded in my old Chevy for a new
Ford," neither "Chevy" nor "Ford" has become a generic term for
"automobile." Yet this same dexterity seems to go unrecognized in
certain areas of trademark law-dilution being the prime
example-that likewise depend on consumers' skillful engagement
with trademark associations.
In such areas, the law withholds information from the consumer,
not because it will lead to confusion or fraud, but rather to control
the types of judgments or associations the consumer will have with
the trademark. If trademark law recognized the active work that
consumers do in engaging with trademarks, it would incorporate a
theory of the consumer that sees him as capable of engaging with
these trademark associations without the law's interference. But
this does not seem to be the case. The characterization of the
consumer is still a matter of considerable debate among courts and
commentators, a debate that often divides along ideologicallines. 8
And, in any event, both the "consumers are savvy'' and the
"consumers are susceptible" camps seem to talk about consumers as
passive receivers of information rather than active participants in
a trademark dialogue. 9 As Graeme Austin has noted, trademark
law "constructs the consumer worldview in ways that minimize the
relevance of consumers' own independent thinking." 10 Thus, the
debate over the proper scope of trademark law often focuses on the

8
See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2051-54 (describing debate over sophistication of
consumers); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:92 (4th ed. 2008) (suggesting that courts' views of consumers'
reasonableness may be outcome-driven); Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in
Trademark Law, 52 ST. Loms U. L.J. 781, 785 (2008) (suggesting that courts' judgments
about consumer confusion reflect their distance from marketplace and context in which
trademarks are encountered).
9
See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK.
L. REv. 827, 832 (2004) (noting that trademark law often treats consumers as "exhibiting ...
unthinking and irrational responses to branding messages").
to Id.
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rights of competitors to use a particular mark rather than on the
rights of consumers. 11
This is so even though trademark law today purports to be
predominantly concerned with the consumer of information. 12 The
basis of an infringement suit is whether the challenged use is "likely
to cause confusion" in the relevant consumer, 13 and courts have been
both more and less solicitous of that consumer's knowledge,
interpretative ability, and intellectual capacity. 14 Treating the
consumer as sophisticated, however, does not change the fact that
she is still seen as one who "consumes"--one entitled at most to a
negative freedom from confusion without the benefit of any positive
theory that actively carves out space for her role in the trademark
conversation.
In order to create this space, trademark law would benefit from
incorporating a vision of the consumer rooted in a theory of
autonomy. This theory would acknowledge not only that consumers
have an important, and perhaps dominant, role to play in the
creation of trademark meaning, but also that the law should favor
restraint when the meaning relates to the persuasive value of the
trademark-an area in which true "deception" plays much less of a
role. Autonomy acknowledges that the interpretive process should
be left as free from interference as possible; hence, it is appropriate
that trademark law have some role to play in filtering out noise
from competitors that incite confusion as to source. 15 But this
theory also counsels that, beyond this scope, the consumer be left
free to make whatever associations she wants with the marks she

11
Cf Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60, 87 (2008) (proposing that trademark law focus on interests ofharmed and benefited
consumers rather than competing sellers).
12
See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 2:33 ("[P)rotection of trademarks is merely a facet of
consumer protection. As a result, the plaintiff in trademark litigation may accurately be
characterized as the 'vicarious avenger' of consumer interests."). But see Mark P. McKenna,
The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1848 (2007)
(noting that trademark law historically protected producers rather than consumers).
13
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
14
See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2040--42 (suggesting that judges and commentators find
consumers more or less sophisticated depending on their agenda).
16
Cf Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L.
REv. 2099, 2110 (2004) (contending that consumer autonomy cannot support "a right to
accurate information or even a right not to be confused").
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encounters, even if those associations are not the ones the mark
holder would prefer, or not the ones that would be optimal from the
perspective of the individual's intellectual or personal
development. 16
An autonomy theory based on the consumer's need for active
involvement in the creation of meaning and the construction ofher
identity as a consumer is aligned with the goals underlying one
theory of the First Amendment. The First Amendment is often
thought of as protecting the rights of speakers, but it can also be
compellingly explained as concerned with the interests of
listeners-the interest in receiving nonfraudulent information and
in making one's own decisions based on that information without
government interference. 17 Consistent with its use in other areas of
speech, however, the First Amendment typically manifests itself in
trademark law through a consideration of speaker's
rights-specifically, a balancing of the right of the corporate (or
parodic) speaker to convey messages to consumers against the
consumer's right not to be defrauded or misled. 18 Here, however, I
am proposing something of a reversal of the communicative
direction: the consumer's interest in speaking to the direction of his
life and the construction of his identity as against the corporate
speaker's desire to control the persuasive nature of speech.
Trademarks are, after all, simply an instance of speech, albeit

16
Cf. id. (arguing that "respect for individual autonomy" cannot justify liability for failure
to provide "completely accurate information in the marketplace").
17
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[The] right to receive information
and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society." (citation
omitted)).
18
Other First Amendment analyses of various aspects of trademark law have focused on
the needs of trademark owners or competitors to speak or on the government's failure to
articulate a sufficiently compelling reason for regulation. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No
Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58
S.C. L. REv. 709, 711 (2007) ("[D]ilution laws violate the First Amendment because they
restrict commercial speech without advancing any substantial government interest.");
Ramsey, supra note 2, at 1156 ("[T]here is no public benefit, and thus no substantial
governmental interest, in encouraging companies to select and use descriptive trademarks
or in enforcing property rights in such marks."). See generally John V. Tait, Note, Trademark
Regulations and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Focusing on the Regulatory Objective to
Classify Speech for First Amendment Analysis, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 897 (1998) (arguing that
trademarks should not be analyzed under commercial speech doctrine unless necessary to
protect consumers from commercial harms).
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commercial in nature, and so we might ask whether the law should
not treat the individual as equally deserving of speech-enhancing
autonomy when she is a consumer as we do when she receives
political or literary speech.
Although it has not always predominated, an autonomy theory of
the recipient of persuasive communications has strong
undercurrents in other speech-related doctrines, including
Establishment Clause cases, political speech cases, defamation
cases, and commercial speech cases. In each of these areas, courts
and commentators have identified the importance of recognizing the
need for limited governmental intervention to enable recipients of
information to make choices that shape their identities. 19 "Limited"
does not mean "nonexistent," of course, and these cases recognize
that intervention is appropriate to prevent fraudulent or misleading
communications. 20 But where the speech at issue is designed to
persuade, rather than defraud, an autonomy theory suggests that
the law should retreat.
This interest seems to be much less prevalent, however, in
trademark law, where it might play an equally helpful role in
helping courts and Congress to decide whether it is appropriate for
the law to intervene in the communication taking place between
producer and consumer through the use of trademarks. In
particular, recognition of consumers' autonomy interests suggests
that the farther the doctrine moves away from instances in which
consumer confusion as to source is the harm to be prevented-the
paradigmatic trademark case-the less vigorous a role trademark
law should play. So, for example, doctrines that provide a cause of
action when the harm to be prevented is the dilution or
diminishment in prestige value of the mark-theories that depend
in part on the persuasive value of the mark rather than on its
source-identifying aspects 21-are less defensible when evaluated
against the consumer's interest in making the autonomous choice

19

See discussion infra Parts II.B.l-3 .
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (holding that First Amendment does not prevent state from
regulating false commercial speech).
21
See Brown, supra note 5, at 1191 (explaining dilution theory as based on persuasive
value of symbols); see also infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
20
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whether to accept the producer's attempt at persuasion or not.
Similarly, initial interest confusion-the theory that the consumer
is diverted at some point in the search process but ultimately is not
confused at the point of sale-relies to some extent on the mark's
persuasive value for its legitimacy. 22 The merchandising cases, to
take one more example, define the harm to be prevented as the false
suggestion to consumers that the mark holder has authorized the
use of the mark on apparel-a harm that, once again, depends not
on the consumer's ability to identify the source of goods but on the
communicative aspects of the mark. 23 In each of these areas,
trademark law intervenes to limit the consumer's decision making
in response to the persuasive value of the mark, channeling
consumers' mental associations with the mark and thus impinging
on autonomy that is necessary to discourse and personal
development.
All this is not to say that we should place a particularly high
moral value on the persuasive value oftrademarks. 24 Ralph Brown
was not wrong to suggest sixty years ago that the value that the
Gucci or Tiffany's trademarks contribute in excess of the quality of
their respective goods is wasteful and that consumers might be
better off if they directed their funds elsewhere; nor is it wrong to
conclude that overall it would be welfare-enhancing if producers
spent much less money and effort on creating this sort of persuasive
communication. 25 But even if advertising causes some marks to

22

See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
24
Several marketing studies address the power ofpersuasion. See, e.g., Paul W. Miniard,
Deepak Sirdeshmukh & Daniel E. Innis, Peripheral Persuasion and Brand Choice, 19 J.
CONSUMER RES. 226, 226 (1992) (defining"peripheral persuasion" as "the influence stemming
from stimuli perceived as irrelevant to making a reasoned evaluation or choice"); Richard E.
Petty, John T. Cacioppo & David Schumann, Central and Peripheral Routes to Advertising
Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 135, 137 (1983)
(suggesting that persuasion is particularly effective when consumer involvement is low).
25
See Brown, supra note 5, at 1169 ("Considering the economic welfare ofthe community
as a whole, to use up part of the national product persuading people to buy product A rather
than product B appears to be a waste of resources."). But see, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier,
Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in
the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1992) ("Far from creating a diversity of taste that
would not otherwise exist, advertising and the use of brand names is an efficient way to
convey information that facilitates the process ofmatching consumers' preexisting tastes with
products that can satisfy them.").
23
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have this level of persuasive value, that is not, by itself, a reason for
the law to regulate it. If trademark law is truly committed to
preserving and enhancing consumer choice, then trademark law's
scope should reflect that commitment.

II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF AUTONOMY
A. THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW

If consumer autonomy is to be a relevant consideration in
determining the proper scope of trademark law, we must first
outline what is meant by autonomy. The version of autonomy that
I have in mind is of the Kantian variety. For Kant, autonomy
means the conscious ability to make choices different from those
dictated either by natural law, by inclination, or by others. 26 Indeed,
as one commentator has noted, autonomy "demands tension
between an individual and the group, tension that is resolved in
decision-making." 27 The value of choice is not in what choice is
ultimately made, but rather in the fact that the choice is personal
to the individual. This is contrasted with a Millian theory of
autonomy, which takes the consequentialist view that society should
prefer autonomy because it leads to the overall well-being of
society. 28 In general, the Millian theory states that individuals are
likely to achieve an optimal result if they are allowed to govern their
own affairs, so long as they do so without causing harm to anyone
else. 29

26
See IMMANuEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL
PHILoSOPHY 43, 89 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) ("Autonomy of the will is the property

of the will by which it is a law to itself .... "); see also Paul Guyer, Kant on the Theory and
Practice of Autonomy, Soc. PHIL. & POL'V, July 2003, at 70, 75-76 (providing concise
understanding of Kant's conception of autonomy).
27
Bernard Berofsky, Identification, the Self, and Autonomy, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y,
July 2003, at 199, 202.
28
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 113 (Henry Holt, 1898) (1859) ("In proportion to
the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is
therefore capable of being more valuable to others.").
29
See id. at 101 ("The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not
make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he . .. merely acts according to his own
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself ... he should be allowed, without
molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost.").
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But a typical Kantian theory of autonomy does not favor choice
simply for choice's sake. Rather, the ability to make unfettered
choices is valued as a means of directing the ultimate course of one's
own life. 30 In so doing-in saying "[t]his is mine; that is not" 31-a
person "constitutes himself."32
Importantly, the Kantian
nonconsequentialist approach values autonomy even if it leads to
suboptimal results for the individual. 33 As Kant wrote, "[a]utonomy
of the will is that quality of the will, by which it is a law to itself
(independently on every quality of the objects of volition)."34
Autonomy therefore encompasses not simply the ability to choose
but also the possibility of making what society might characterize
(too simply) as the wrong choice because it exists contrary to selfinterest.35 Thus, as Christopher Heath Wellman suggests, a
consequentialist might argue that a government's imposition of
religion on its citizens will not provide the best overall results, while
a nonconsequentialist opposes government establishment of religion
because "this interference with my religious self-determination
30

Marina Oshana, How Much Should We Value Autonomy?, Soc. PHIL. &
POL'y, July 2003, at 99, 101; see also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational
Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, Soc. PHIL. & POL'y,
July 2004, at 215, 220 (describing "meaningful autonomy" as capacity to lead meaningful life
without unnecessary intrusion of others).
31
Berofsky, supra note 27, at 209.
32
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 170 (1988); see also Steven Wall, Freedom as a Political Ideal, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y,
July 2003, at 307, 307--08 ("An autonomous life is one in which a person charts his own course
through life, fashioning his character by self-consciously choosing projects and assuming
commitments from a wide range of eligible alternatives, and making something out ofhis life
according to his own understanding of what is valuable and worth doing.").
33
See KANT, supra note 26, at 83--86 (arguing that autonomy-giving law to one's self-is
always preferable to heteronomy-being beholden to outside influences); see also Christopher
Heath Wellman, The Paradox of Group Autonomy, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, July 2003, at 265, 266
(advocating nonconsequentialist account of value of autonomy in part because "individuals
retain their positions of dominion even when their decision-making clearly does not maximize
overall happiness"). Thus, as Wellman notes, "even if all of the evidence suggests that [an
individual's choice) would be horribly detrimental to her well-being, she remains at liberty
to make this move because it is her life." Id.; see also Jonathan Jacobs, Some Tensions
Between Autonomy and Self-Governance, Soc. PHIL. & POL'y, July 2003, at 221, 224-26
(describing influence on other moral theorists of Kant's conception of morality as grounded
in rational autonomy).
34
EMANUEL KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL AND VARIOUS
PHILoSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 98 (William Richardson trans., 1798).
35
See, e.g., Berofsky, supra note 27, at 199 (suggesting that one's refusal "to express or
realize a dimension of self' does not imply that he has "failed to act autonomously").
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treats me wrongly. "36 In such a system, an individual acts no less
autonomously if he does not engage in self-conscious reflection on
the process that leads him to a particular choice, so long as that
choice is the product of his own values. 37 This may mean that an
individual's exercise ofher autonomy leaves her in a worse position,
overall, than before, but this is not, according to
nonconsequentialists, a reason to deny that individual the ability to
act autonomously going forward. Ultimately, nonconsequentialists
conceive of autonomy as deontological, as something to which
individuals are entitled, as opposed to resting on teleological
claims. 38 This is not to say that other deontological considerations
might not trump one's interest in autonomy, but simply that
consequences in and of themselves are not the deciding factor. The
attractiveness of a nonconsequentialist view is that it is absolute; it
does not require empirical analysis of whether the validation of
autonomy in any particular case serves identified ends or whether
the interests served in any one case are outweighed by a nonautonomy-respectingrestriction. 39 The focus of autonomy is process,
not product.
Because autonomy is inextricably linked with the ability to
choose, it is necessary for a full exercise of autonomy to have a range
of choices. 4° From a deontological perspective, the government's
attempt to restrict the choices available to an individual on the
ground that certain choices are not welfare-enhancing treats that
individual as incapable of rejecting certain options on her own, thus

36

Wellman, supra note 33, at 266.
See Berofsky, supra note 27, at 220 ("[O]ne cannot be counted autonomous unless one
is actually guided by values and principles endorsed by autonomous reflection.").
38
See Wellman, supra note 33, at 272 ("The chief reason why no autonomy-related
amendments within consequentialism will ultimately suffice is because agents are entitled
to their self-determination, and entitlement is a fundamentally deontological notion that
cannot be fully cashed out in consequentialist terms."); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 225
(distinguishing "formal autonomy"-which responds to deontological claims-from
"meaningful autonomy"-which is more teleological).
39
See Baker, supra note 30, at 228 (suggesting that consequentialist approach to speechrelated interests requires balancing of competing interests).
40
STEVEN WALL, LffiERALISM, PERFECTIONISM, AND RESTRAINT 128 (1998) (describing
autonomy as "the ideal of people charting their own course through life, fashioning their
character by self-consciously choosing projects and taking up commitments from a wise range
of eligible alternatives").
37
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interfering with her autonomy. 41 Respect for autonomy does not
mean, however, that the law may never regulate systems affording
individuals the ability to make choices; it simply means that
intervention is more appropriate when it serves to maximize choice
or, put differently, to ensure that others do not engage in behavior
that minimizes choice. Although these lines may be difficult to draw
at the margins, autonomy theory provides a basis on which to judge
the appropriateness of a government's attempt to shape its citizens'
identity-creating activities.
As a threshold matter, autonomy theory could incorporate one of
two theories of the individual: It can view the individual as
someone whose autonomy is preserved whether he enjoys it to its
full extent or not, or it can tie the level of autonomy to the
individual's capacity to use it. In the version I am describing here,
the theory takes (to use Richard Fallon's terminology42 ) more of an
"ascriptive"--or aspirational-view than a "descriptive" view of
autonomy. Like tort law's construction of the "reasonable person,"
an ascriptive view is not empirically based; it constructs a model of
how individuals should act rather than how they actually do act. 43
It admits that the exercise of this version of autonomy may be
"insufficiently informed, self-aware, and self-critical to count as
autonomous under any very stringent standards of descriptive
autonomy,"44 but it accepts this criticism in light of its view of the
appropriate role oflaw. To give individuals only the autonomy they
"deserve" is to question the very nature of autonomy.

41
See Baker, supra note 30, at 226 ("[A) state acts improperly when its aim is to suppress
individual choice as a means of carrying out even the state's good aims.").
42
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 875, 879-93 (1994) (describing ascriptive and descriptive conceptions of autonomy).
While both models have their difficulties, the ascriptive model must minimize the difficulty
that some groups, such as children, will have in conforming to aspirational goals. As with tort
law, it might therefore be appropriate to modify what is "reasonable" for such groups. Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) ("If the actor is a child, the standard of
conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of
like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.").
43
See Heymann, supra note 8, at 782 ("The reasonable person in tort law is someone who
sets a standard of care, who models how the law tells us we should act as we go about our
lives.").
44
Fallon, supra note 42, at 893.
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B. AUTONOMY AS FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY

One possible use of the Kantian theory of autonomy is to describe
the appropriate scope of the First Amendment. As Ronald Dworkin
has noted, this justification views it as an "essential and
'constitutive' feature of a just political society that government treat
all its adult members, except those who are incompetent, as
responsible moral agents" who can be trusted to make judgments for
themselves among competitors for their attention and mindshare. 45
Accordingly, we should be skeptical oflaws that regulate speech on
the ground that it may be effective or persuasive, even if the result
is ultimately detrimental to the recipient of the speech. As
described earlier, 46 this view contrasts with an instrumental view of
the First Amendment in its deontological basis; it cares not whether
the autonomy is used toward any particular end. 47 It therefore may
overlap with-but not be entirely consonant with-a theory of the
First Amendment that seeks to maximize truth-seeking. As
reflected in Justice Holmes's "marketplace of ideas,"48 the truth
theory posits that although truth may never be attained, the best
hope of reaching it is through the free flourishing of a multiplicity
of ideas, rather than through prejudgment of particular messages
by the govemment. 49 If too much speech is banned by the
government, speakers will be chilled-not only those directly subject
to the law at issue, but also those near the zone of prohibition who
fear that they too may be subject to the law. 50 Restrictions on
45

RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 200 (1996); see also id. ("Government insults its
citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it decrees that they cannot be trusted
to hear opinions that might persuade them to dangerous or offensive convictions.").
46
See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
47
See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise ofthe Technology-Specific Approach
to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 312 (2003) (describing ascriptive vision of First
Amendment, which respects autonomy "regardless of whether it furthers any particular
instrumental value").
46
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T)he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... ").
49
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (describing "truth-seeking
function of marketplace of ideas"); id. at 56 (" [I]t is a central tenet of the First Amendment
that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas." (quoting FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978))).
50
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 52i U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (noting "chilling effect on free
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government intervention are favored so that the speaker has
"breathing room," avoids a "chilling effect," and can contribute to the
marketplace ofideas. 51 In order to avoid this chilling effect, truth
theorists suggest, the First Amendment should be interpreted so as
to tolerate a certain amount of uncertainty and falsity, with the idea
that the truth ultimately will come out. 52 The result ultimately
benefits the listener-the consumer in the marketplace-but it does
so by adjudicating the rights of the speaker.
But no individual's autonomy can be fully formed merely by
shouting into the wind.
An important component of free
communication is the ability to receive messages and determine the
worth of those messages for oneself. 53 An autonomy theory of the
First Amendment, therefore, should be focused as much on the
listener as on the speaker. While the truth theory is about product,
listener-focused autonomy theory is about process. It is not
concerned with the result of an individual's decision making so long
as the process by which the decision is made is not corrupted. Thus,
it focuses not on the right to speak one's mind free from
governmental intrusion, but rather on the right of the audience to
receive messages intended to persuade. 54 The theory assumes that,
given a marketplace of ideas free from fraud and deception, a
listener has the moral right to decide for herself which ideas are

speech" created by vague speech regulations).
51
See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DMDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 37-38 (1996) (noting importance of uninhibited public debate).
52
See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom ofExpression, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1219 (2008) (discussing view that suppressing false speech may
result in "chilling effect" suppressing some truthful speech).
53
See SUSAN H. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: FEMINlST THEORY AND THE
FlRST AMENDMENT 41-44 (2004) (discussing conscious choice as primary aspect of autonomy);
see also Martin H. Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591,610 (1982) ("[B]y
adopting a democratic system we are expressing a belief that presumably individuals are
capable of deciding what is best for them.").
54
See WILLIAMS, supra note 53, at 20 ("[G]overnmental attempts to manipulate the
choices of citizens by restricting the information to which they have access ... would
represent a failure to respect autonomy because such efforts rest on a distrust of citizens'
ability to choose for themselves."); Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 159, 163-67, 170 (1997) ("A system of free expression based on Kantian
autonomy . . . would not merely concern itself with protection against government
suppression.").
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most persuasive. Thus, the government has the right to regulate
the market to allow for free decision making on the part oflisteners,
but does not have the right to interfere with listeners' ultimate
thought processes. For example, an autonomy theory would grant
the government the right to regulate deliberate false statements on
the ground that they "interfere with a person's control over her own
reasoning processes, "55 although it might be less supportive of
regulating innocent falsehoods because such statements are not
intended to invade the listener's autonomous domain. 56
As with the theory more generally, proponents of an autonomy
theory of the First Amendment must decide whether the theory
relies on an ascriptive or descriptive view of how individuals make
decisions-whether the theory operates under the presumption that,
once false or fraudulent communications are restricted, individuals
should be assumed to possess sufficient faculties to engage with
persuasive communications, or whether our inherent fallibilities
must be taken into account. As Richard Fallon has suggested, an
ascriptive theory might suggest that regulation of advertising that
persuades people to engage in unhealthful activities (smoking, for
example) is undesirable, as such regulation purports to interfere
with individual choice. 57 On the other hand, to the extent we believe
that smoking is harmful, a descriptive theory would suggest that
regulating such advertising may ultimately promote individual
autonomy because it recognizes the inability of some consumers to

55

David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 334, 354 (1991); see also Spottswood, supra note 52, at 1222 ("Multiple authors have
posited that we should treat deliberate lies differently from innocent mistakes, because only
lies violate the autonomy of listeners .... ").
56
In the defamation context, for example, the Supreme Court has held that, at least with
respect to matters of public concern or matters involving public officials or public figures,
liability cannot attach without some level of fault or scienter. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (matters of public concern); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (public figures); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (public officials).
57
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 31 ("To censor speech on the ground
that the listener could not be trusted to evaluate its content would ... affront the listener's
autonomy in most cases.").
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resist such persuasion and frees them to make choices in other
areas of their lives. 58
In order to consider whether this theory has any lessons for
trademark law, it might be useful to focus more closely on the
autonomy interest as it appears in First Amendment cases where
the goal of the restricted speech is to persuade. Where the Court
has recognized an autonomy interest, it has been of the ascriptive
variety, rather than the descriptive variety that is more prevalent
in trademark law. 59 The Court's analysis of autonomy does not
consider whether listeners are capable of negotiating with the
messages they receive; the Court either assumes such a capability
exists or disregards the issue. To be sure, the case law in this area
is far from coherent or unified. My goal here is not to engage
directly with competing theories of the First Amendment, to resolve
the inconsistencies in the Court's use of autonomy theory, 60 or to
suggest that autonomy theory predominates in the Court's approach
to First Amendment cases. Rather, my aim is to note the presence
of the theory in areas in which listeners are asked to interpret
communications and then to explore exporting these considerations
to trademark law. I focus here on cases in three areas: electionrelated communications, the Establishment Clause endorsement
cases, and defamation law. 61 In each of these areas, the Court
suggests an ascriptive view of autonomy, constructing a reader who
makes choices about the value of the speech with which she is
presented without overly solicitous protection from the Court. 62
58

See id. at 32 ("[I)fimage-based cigarette advertising manipulates some of its targets
into states of addiction, regulation might do more to promote than to frustrate descriptive
autonomy.").
59
Cf Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 446 (1971) ("Although the first
amendment assumes that man has a will and an intellect, its concern is that he should use
them; it does not turn on whether he does use them.").
60
·
See Fallon, supra note 42, at 876 (noting complexity of First Amendment autonomy
theory); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications
of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 134-36 (analyzing First Amendment autonomy
theory).
61
For a similar description ofKantian philosophy in other areas of the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence, discussing cases concerning the incitement of unlawful
action, fighting words, and obscenity, as well as libel and commercial speech, see Wells, supra
note 54, at 179-87.
62
For a thorough treatment of the Supreme Court's view of rational audiences in First
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1. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. Ascriptive autonomy
is evident in cases concerning election-related speech. In these
cases, the Court has attempted to distinguish speech that has the
potential to corrupt the process-and therefore is properly the
subject of regulation-from speech that merely has the potential to
persuade listeners. 63 Although the First Amendment inquiry
typically focuses on the plaintiff speaker-who is seeking to
preserve her right to participate in the political process without
restrictions as to the type of message she is permitted to
convey-any recognition of a speaker's right necessarily requires an
implicit recognition of an autonomous and capable listener, even if
not every recipient can realistically be described as such. In other
words, if the proposed governmental restriction-typically based on
justifications such as protecting the listener from misleading
communications-must fail, it fails even despite the risk that some
listeners might well be suboptimally persuaded.
Take, for example, Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. 64
Margaret Mcintyre, under the pseudonym "Concerned Parents and
Tax Payers," wrote and distributed leaflets opposing a proposed
school tax levy to attendees at a public meeting concerning the
levy. 65 She was subsequently charged under an Ohio statute
prohibiting the distribution of political literature without the

Amendment cases, see generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as
First Amendment Ideal (Univ. of Fla. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-16, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365979. A rationality- or autonomy-based approach
to regulating persuasive communications leaves the reader/recipient as the final interpretive
authority, as she is the one who ultimately evaluates the communication. I have suggested
elsewhere that a reader-response approach to intellectual property doctrine may prove
fruitful. See generally Laura A Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and
Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J .L. & ARTS 445 (2008) (applying reader-response theory to
copyright law); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth ofthe Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity,
and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005) [hereinafter Heymann, The Birth
of the Authornym] (same as to trademark law).
63
See Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme
Court's Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 225, 266-67 (2003) (describing
Court's focus on speech that is "unduly influential" rather than informative). But see id.
at 251 (concluding that Court's recent cases "show that the Court [is] willing to restrict ...
speech when it suspects . . . that the speech is likely to unduly confuse or improperly
influence voters").
64
514 u.s. 334 (1995).
65
Id. at 337.
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identification of the author. 66 Mrs. Mcintyre argued that the statute
infringed upon her First Amendment right to engage in otherwise
lawful discourse anonymously, framing the issue from the
perspective of the anonymous speaker-the "street corner leafletter" whose speech might be chilled by an identification
requirement. 67 The State (and its amici) defended the statute in
part by referring to consumer protection-like activities:
identification was necessary to prevent fraud and confusion on the
part of the voting public. 68
The Court's decision thus pits the speaker's right to speak
anonymously-whether motivated by "fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire
to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible"69-against the
reader's right to receive relevant information that arguably aids in
interpretation. 70 In resolving this dispute in favor of the speaker
(the lonely pamphleteer who subsequently becomes the hero of the
story71 ), the Court necessarily constructs an autonomous reader. In
other words, by concluding that the First Amendment requires the
government, at least in some circumstances, to permit anonymous
speech-notwithstanding the argument that anonymity withholds
potentially useful information from the recipient-the Court

66
67

Id. at 338 & n.3.
See Brief of Petitioner at 9, Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)

(No. 93-986) (outlining Mcintyre's constitutional claims).
68
See Brief of Respondent at 32, Mcintyre, 514 U.S. 334 (No. 93-986)(" [D]isclosure of the
identity of the writer helps the public to appraise the source and evaluate the value and
sincerity of the message."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of Tennessee et al.,
in Support of Respondent at 7, Mcintyre, 514 U.S. 334 (No. 93-986) ("Disclosure is justified
by the state's interest in providing voters with a means to better evaluate the contents of
political literature."); Brief of the Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 10, Mcintyre, 514 U.S. 334 (No. 93-986) ("Communications
advocating a particular election outcome which are unaccompanied by proper identification
carry a high potential for confusing and deceiving voters.").
69
Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42; see also id. at 342 (noting that anonymity also "provides
a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge
her message simply because they do not like its proponent").
70
See id. at 348 (discussing Ohio's asserted interest in "providing the electorate with
relevant information").
71
See, e.g., id. at 357 (describing anonymous pamphleteering as "an honorable tradition
of advocacy and of dissent"); see also id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing
that First Amendment protects anonymous political leafletting). But see id. at 385 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's view of anonymous pamphleteers).
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implicitly suggests its reliance on the capability of recipients to
Without such a
function without such information. 72
reader-someone capable of engaging with speech despite its
anonymous nature, then determining its value for herself-the
speaker's claimed right to speak anonymously would have to give
way. Otherwise the risk would simply be too great.
The Court emphasizes this point by characterizing the speaker's
identity as "no different from other components of the document's
content that the author is free to include or exclude."73 As such, the
inclusion of an author's identity cannot be regulated on the ground
that a recipient might find that identification makes the
accompanying sentiments more or less persuasive; rather,
anonymity is itself something the reader is trusted to take into
account. In this vein, the Court quotes approvingly from a New
York court's 1974 opinion:
Don't underestimate the common man. People are
intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an
anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous.
They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its
anonymity along with its message, as long as they are
permitted, as they must be, to read that message. And
then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide
what is "responsible," what is valuable, and what is
truth. 74

72
See id. at 348-49 (majority opinion) (arguing that omission of author's identity does
not affect reader's ability to evaluate author's message).
73
ld. at 348.
74
ld. at 348 n.ll (quoting People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1974)); see
also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The premise of the First Amendment is that the American
people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance
of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source."); id. at 286 (Kennedy,
J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment guarantees our citizens
the right to judge for themselves the most effective means for the expression of political views
and to decide for themselves which entities to trust as reliable speakers."). In her brief to the
Court, Mrs. Mcintyre argued: "[l]t is inconceivable that the government could require
speakers to discuss the weaknesses as well as the strengths of their political positions, even
if 'full disclosure' would lead to a better informed electorate." Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 67, at 33.

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 670 2008-2009

2009]

THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN IN TRADEMARK LAW

671

This language has strong ascriptive autonomous undertones. 75 It
assumes that a participant in the political process-the "common
man," no less-is capable and discerning, and it structures the
government's response accordingly. It does not consider the wide
range of abilities or literacy among the voting public or take an
incremental approach to regulation; instead, it constructs a reader
with capacity, with the ability to engage in interpretation and make
associations without the need for governmental intervention. 76 As
one commentator noted, "[t]he citizen/'consumer' in the
'marketplace' ... is quite capable of evaluating the 'products' that
compete for his or her attention, no matter how they are
presented. "77
It is true, of course, that the Court does not acknowledge the
aspirational nature of its assessment. It does not, for example, state
that although the "common man" might be "intelligent enough to
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing, "78 particular
individuals may be far less equipped. But this lacuna only serves to
demonstrate the line the Court appears to draw: When the content
at issue can be characterized as having the capability to change the
recipient's mind about whether the speech is "responsible,"
"valuable," and "truth[ful], "79 rather than deceptive (as the State of
Ohio urged in Mcintyre 80 ), courts need not consider the fact that
listeners may reach different conclusions about the nature of the
speech. As the Court emphasized, listeners "must be" permitted to

75

One commentator has characterized this view as an "aspirational" approach that
"express[es] an overriding faith in human nature and man's capacity for self-governance."
Brian K Pinaire, Strange Brew: Method and Form in Electoral Speech Jurisprudence, 14 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 271, 289 (2005).
76
In Mcintyre and other opinions, the Court has distinguished campaign financing,
suggesting that disclosure requirements are warranted in that context because of the need
to avoid corruption ofthe electoral process. See, e.g., Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 356 ("In candidate
elections, the Government can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption
that might result from campaign expenditures."); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88
(noting governmental interest in "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process [and]
preventing corruption" in context of campaign-related speech (first alteration in original)
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978))).
77
Pinaire, supra note 75, at 291.
78
Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
79
80

Id.
See 514 U.S. at 348 (discussing Ohio's argument that its interest in preventing

fraudulent statements justified its disclosure requirements).
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engage in this deliberative exercise, as it is "for them" to live with
the consequences oftheir decision. 81
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 82 provides another
example of lurking autonomous interests. In Bellotti, the Court
invalidated a state law prohibiting certain corporations from
making expenditures for the purpose of influencing the vote on
various referenda. 83 In rejecting the state's characterization of the
harm to be prevented-that listeners might find particular types of
corporate communications persuasive--the Court again turned to
autonomy-based language:
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in
making their judgment, the source and credibility of the
advocate. But if there be any danger that the people
cannot evaluate the information and arguments
advanced by [corporations], it is a danger contemplated
by the Framers of the First Amendment.84

81
ld. The Duryea court's reference to the "truth" of the underlying speech might also be
read as supporting a Millian view of the First Amendment. Cf Sullivan, supra note 60, at 133
(referring to "Millian notion that the unregulated clash of individual expression will produce
truth in the long run"). The court's emphasis, however, on the recipients of the speech and
their role in the process, as opposed to the ultimate result of that process, suggests an
autonomy theory rather than a Millian one.
82
435 u.s. 765 (1978).
83
ld. at 767. The Massachusetts statute, in pertinent part, prohibited banks and other
specified businesses "from making contributions or expenditures 'for the purpose of . . .
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.'" Id. at 767-£8
(alteration in original) (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). The
plaintiff corporations wished to expend funds to publicize their views on a proposed
constitutional amendment to be put before voters in an upcoming election; the amendment
permitted the imposition of a graduated individual income tax. I d. at 769.
84
!d. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 791 n.31 ("Government is forbidden to
assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves.
The First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes ... which restrict
what the people may hear." (citations omitted)); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60
(1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the
State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.").
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Here, again, the Court draws a distinction between the types of
harm asserted and thus the types of regulation permitted. If, the
Court noted, the state had provided evidence that "corporate
advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes" by drowning out other voices, thereby limiting choice and
"denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests," then
regulation of such corporate speech might be constitutionally
permissible. 85 But because the state's claim really involved the
perceived danger that corporate advocacy might succeed in
persuading voters-a concern not about process but about
product-the Court concluded that autonomy interests should
prevail. 86 The Court was not simply concerned with the "right to
receive information"87 (against which some form of regulation might
be justified to ensure that only preferable information is received),
but with the right to "evaluate" the information received. 88
The Court has not consistently used autonomy interests,
however, to justify its approach to speech-restricting legislation
under the First Amendment. Indeed, in later election law cases, the
Court has upheld certain governmental disclosure requirements
relating to communications to voters that on their face would be
inconsistent with autonomy interests. 89 Even in these cases,

85

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. Interestingly, the Court suggests-in dicta-a position
contrary to that which it had taken in Mcintyre. Compare id. at 792 n.32 ("Corporate
advertising, unlike some methods of participation in political campaigns, is likely to be highly
visible. Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure,
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected."
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6EH>7 (1976))), with Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 ( 1995) ("'People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source
of an anonymous writing.' " (quoting People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup.
Ct. 1974))).
88
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 ("[T)he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly a reason to suppress it .... ").
87
Cf id. at 807-08 (White, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that there may be certain
communications undertaken by corporations which could not be restricted without impinging
seriously upon the right to receive information .... None of these considerations, however,
are implicated by a prohibition upon corporate expenditures relating to referenda concerning
questions of general public concern having no connection with corporate business affairs.").
88
Id. at 792 (majority opinion).
89
See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003) (upholding
disclosure requirements in campaign finance context); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990) (upholding statute prohibiting corporations from
making campaign expenditures from general treasury funds); see also McConnell, 540 U.S.
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however, the Court has taken care to distinguish potential
interference with the political process from the possibility of
persuasion. InAustin v. Michigan State Chambero{Commerce, for
example, the Court did not characterize the state statute at issue as
seeking "to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections,"
but rather as aiming to prevent the risk of corruption ofthe political
process by large corporate contributions to candidates for political
office. 90 The Court offered a weaker, but similar, distinction in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. 91 Accordingly, these
cases are not ultimately inconsistent with an autonomy interest; to
the contrary, they suggest the Court's view that autonomy cannot
properly function without clear channels of communication that
eliminate attempts (i.e., through fraudulent communications) to
interfere with individual choice.
2. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.
Another First Amendment data point might come from the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause cases-in particular, the way in
which the Court has discussed the limitations that the Clause
imposes on religious displays as a form of communication. This is
relevant to the present inquiry because the question, at heart, asks
whether the viewer of a nongovernmental, religious-themed display
can be trusted to negotiate with the message conveyed even though
the sponsorship of that display might be unclear on its face (as in
Mcintyre).
At its core, the constitutional concern over government
endorsement of religion respects the autonomy of individuals in
their religious preferences. Government endorsement-or perceived
government endorsement-conveys a declaration of "religious
truth"92 as well as, as Justice O'Connor has noted, a declaration (or

at 276 (Thomas, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Mcintyre
should be read to invalidate disclosure requirements in election-related speech "solely based
on the governmental interest in providing information to the voters").
90
494 U.S. at 660.
91
540 U.S. at 206 n.88 (distinguishing "campaign speech" from "genuine issue ads").
92
See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD.
L. REV. 713, 727 (2001) (arguing that Establishment Clause prohibits government
declarations of religious truth); see also Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1372 (2000) (defining "endorsement" of religion
in terms of "whether [a challenged practice) sent a message that a particular religion, or
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insinuation) of inclusion or exclusion in the political community,
depending on one's position relative to the display. 93 Thus, the
purpose of the Establishment Clause is to establish a bulwark
against such a message and to preserve individual autonomy and
self-governance-"the freedom to make judgments for oneself
concerning what is good and right, without governmental influence,
through the exercise of one's practical reason."94 This is true
whether or not the viewer is particularly offended or otherwise
influenced by the message that government endorsement conveys.
A plaintiff need not show, for example, that she was excluded from
some government benefit on the basis ofher religious beliefs (or lack
thereoO or that she suffered some sort of demonstrable psychic or
physical harm as a result of the display; it is sufficient that the
display infringed on her autonomy by suggesting that her
government endorses a particular religious preference. 95
One might say that the place that autonomy occupies in the
endorsement cases is not this simple. In order for the government
endorsement of religion to convey any truth at all, the recipient of
that message not only must believe it to be true (or, at least,
possibly true) but also must be persuadable enough for that message
to carry some weight. The viewer of a religious display who intuits
some level of government sponsorship but attributes no weight to it
in his deliberations over religious truth has arguably suffered no
constitutional injury. If the point ofthe Establishment Clause is to

religion in general, was officially approved").
93
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
ofthe political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community."). Although Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented from the majority opinion in Lynch, finding no
endorsement in the inclusion of a creche in a municipal Christmas display, they agreed with
Justice O'Connor's explanation for the doctrine. See id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Those who believe in the message of the nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit
of public recognition and approval of their views .... The effect on minority religious groups,
as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their views are
not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support.").
94
Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement ofReligion: An
Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAULL. REv. 53, 67 (1990) (citing
D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-73 (1986)).
95
See Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1286 (E.D. Okla. 2006) ("All
a plaintiff need do is view the [state-sponsored image) and take offense.").
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prevent the government from persuading the individual as to
religious preferences, one might then conclude that the Clause
envisions that individual as needing protection. Consistent with the
election law cases described earlier,96 a truly autonomous individual
should, perhaps, be permitted to receive all religious
messages-government sponsored or not-and consider for herself
whether to credit the government's religious message. Thus, the
First Amendment's prohibition against government establishment
of religion treats government endorsement of religion in the same
way that it treats campaign financin~ 7 or, as we shall see, false
speech: 98 as a corruption of the process, not as an attempt at
persuasion. The Establishment Clause creates a prohibition against
the government participating in the discussion at all, whether
persuasively or not. 99 The individual's right is not a right to be free
from persuasion by her government; it is a right to exclude the
government from even trying.
In circumstances when the government is not the speaker,
however, the Court's language again relies on an ascriptively
autonomous viewer: someone who is deemed to have the capacity
to assess the display and decide for herself whether to be persuaded
by the religious message it conveys. In Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette, the Court considered whether a state's
denial of an application by the Ku Klux Klan to display an
unattended cross on the statehouse square was justified by the
conclusion that, had the application been granted, viewers of the
cross would have believed it to be a state endorsement ofreligion. 100
A plurality consisting of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
then Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the conclusion that the mere
presence of a privately sponsored symbol in close proximity to a
government building mandates a finding of endorsement, even if

96

See supra Part II.B.l.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
98
See infra Part II.B.3.
99
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590
(1989) ("[T]his Court has come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that
government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or
organization .... ").
100
515 u.s. 753, 757-59 (1995).
97
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some viewers might reach that conclusion. 101 Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, rejected the plurality's
conclusion that endorsement cannot be present where the
government neither intends nor encourages any message of
endorsement. 102 Rather, she concluded that the effect of the
message is key, and so the endorsement test should focus on the
perception of a "reasonable, informed observer"/03 if this observer
perceives endorsement, even mistakenly, Justice O'Connor
concluded, then it is a court's duty to hold the display invalid. 104 But
she cautioned that this test-a test that would prohibit a religious
display whenever "some passersby would perceive a governmental
endorsement thereof' 105-is aimed not at any particular individual
but rather at someone akin to the "reasonable person" in tort law
who represents "a more collective standard to gauge 'the "objective"
meaning of the [government's] statement in the community.' "106
Such a person, Justice O'Connor asserted, is not an empty vessel,
limited in his worldview to the four corners of the display in front of
him, but rather "must be deemed aware of the history and context
of the community and forum in which the religious display appears"
to determine whether government endorsement is present in a
particular case. 107 The reasonable person, moreover, "would

101

ld. at 765 ("Surely some [uninformed members of the community] ... might leap to the
erroneous conclusion of state endorsement. But ... given an open forum and private
sponsorship, erroneous conclusions do not count.").
102
I d. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
103
ld. at 773.
104
ld. at 777.
106
ld. at 779.
106
ld. (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor continued:
I therefore disagree that the endorsement test should focus on the
actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing
degrees of knowledge. Under such an approach, a religious display is
necessarily precluded so long as some passersby would perceive a
governmental endorsement thereof.... Thus, "we do not ask whether
there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether
some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable
person might think [the State] endorses religion."
ld. at 779-80 (alteration in original) (quoting Ams. United for Separation of Church & State
v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir. 1992)).
107
ld. at 780.
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certainly be able to read and understand an adequate disclaimer, "108
with Justice Souter's added caveat that not every disclaimer would
be effective.109
Both the plurality's and Justice O'Connor's constructed viewer,
then, is someone who is entrusted with the task of assessing the
message conveyed by a religious display, even if that assessment
turns out to be mistaken. The plurality takes a decidedly
anti paternalistic view, disregarding rather than acknowledging the
costs of such mistakes. Justice O'Connor's "reasonable, informed
observer" is similarly positioned but more generously described: as
with Mcintyre's "common man," the "reasonable, informed observer"
is someone who has the capacity to situate a persuasive message
among other communications and make judgments as to whether or
not to accept it. In either case, the Court does not appear
particularly concerned about the outcome of those judgments (i.e.,
whether they would leave the viewer worse off), so long as the
process ofinterpretation is left free from governmental interference.
And, even more so than in Mcintyre, the "reasonable, informed
observer" is truly ascriptive. As lower courts have concluded, she
would be aware of the various historical uses of the phrase "In God
We Trust";110 the approximate length of time a plaque had been
installed on a courthouse and whether the government had
highlighted or celebrated the plaque since its installation;m and the
practices of a public school in allowing groups to distribute
literature on campus. 112 She would know the history of Supreme
Court First Amendment litigation; 113 a city's policies regarding

108

ld. at 782.
I d. at 794 n.2 (Souter, J ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court
recommended a similar attribution requirement in Bellotti. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) ("'dentification of the source of advertising may be
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments
to which they are being subjected.").
110
Lambeth v. Bd. ofCom.m'rs, 407 F.3d 266, 272 (4th Cir. 2005).
111
Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 251 (3d
Cir. 2003).
112
Peck v. Upshur County Bd. ofEduc., 155 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir. 1998).
113
See, e.g., Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 35 (2d Cir. 2006) (attributing to
reasonable observer knowledge of Supreme Court's holiday display jurisprudence); Tenafly
Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2002) (attributing to
reasonable observer knowledge of history of dispute between city and religious groups).
109

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 678 2008-2009

2009]

THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN IN TRADEMARK LAW

679

placement of holiday displays on city streets by private groups; 114
and the policies of a municipality regarding the type ofinstallations
it typically erects. 115 Indeed, the reasonable, informed observer
often displays a remarkable breadth ofknowledge, including, as one
court suggested, knowledge of the following facts:
For many years, the Kenton County Courthouse has
closed on Good Friday. The orders and resolutions of the
various courts and county and state officers made
specific reference to Good Friday. The courthouse
usually closed for the entire day, although by law only
half a day was a state holiday.
The observer would also be aware that there is an
abundance oflocal church services in this area on Good
Friday. Many churches offer services in the early
morning, during the lunch hour, and after working
hours. Thus, it is not necessary for the courthouse
employees to be off work to attend services.
Under the Supreme Court criteria, the observer
would also be aware of the history of this controversy.
He or she would know that as soon as objections to the
sign [posted on the courthouse door announcing Good
Friday closing and depicting crucifixion of Christ]
surfaced in 1996, the courthouse authorities removed
the sign. The observer would also know that the official
posting the sign immediately disclaimed any intent to
endorse religion.
The observer is presumed to know that some officials
stated that they closed because it was traditional; others

114
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). But see id. at 59 n.6
(Cabranes, J., dissenting) ("The majority has in mind not a 'reasonable, informed observer'
but an omniscient observer, whose experience sweeps in not just what is visible to the naked
eye or to an aware citizen of the community but the unseen closed-door meetings of local
retailers and politicians as well.").
115
See Am. Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 65 F.3d 1539, 1545 (9th Cir. 1995)
(suggesting reasonable observer might infer City's participation in erection of27-foot, 5,500pound menorah), withdrawn and superseded by 90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996).
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that they closed because there would be problems
getting services such as heat and maintenance. 116
This "reasonable, informed observer" is, as Justice O'Connor
acknowledged, a legal fiction. 117 This observer interprets the display
not only through the context of the image before him, but also
through the context ofthe legal, political, and historical framework
surrounding the display. He is, at heart, a judicial being armed
with perfect information, 118 a standard of perception below which

116
Granzeier v. Middleton, 955 F. Supp. 741, 74 7-48 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (footnote omitted).
The court concluded that "from the perspective of the observer informed of all these facts, the
courthouse closing does not appear to endorse the Christian religion." ld. at 748 (footnote
omitted).
117
See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[The reasonable) observer is
similar to the 'reasonable person' in tort law, who 'is not to be identified with any ordinary
individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things,' but is 'rather a personification
of a community ideal of reasonable behavior .... ' " (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984))).
118
In Pinette, Justice Stevens suggested that Justice O'Connor's observer "comes off as
a well-schooled jurist." Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, e.g.,
Susan Hanley Kosse,A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Frarn,ework
in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139, 144-49 (2006) (contrasting Justice O'Connor's conception of
reasonable person with Justice Stevens's and noting confusion among lower courts in wake
of Pinette); Kirsten K. Wendela, Comment, Context Is in the Eye of the Beholder:
Establishment Clause Violations and the More-Than-Reasonable Person, 80 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 981, 999-1000 (2005) (characterizing Justice O'Connor's reasonable person as "[a)n
[u)nrealistic [e)xpectation").
Not every court interprets the standard as broadly. For example, the Third Circuit
reasoned:
We agree with Justice Stevens that assuming the reasonable observer
is aware of "history and context" when viewing a municipality's religious
display is "a highly unlikely supposition." In our view, when testing for
endorsement, we must take into account the perspective of those citizens
within the community who hold minority religious views.
Thus, we cannot agree that an observer of the display who is a new
resident to Jersey City, has no understanding of the history of the
community, but has a strong sense of his or her own faith, a faith not
depicted in the display, is somehow less "reasonable" an observer than the
Christian or Jewish observer who has lived in Jersey City for twenty
years. It follows that this new resident of Jersey City should be entitled
to no less Establishment Clause protection than a long-time resident.
Accordingly, we conclude that the reasonable observer of Jersey City's
display cannot be presumed to have knowledge of Jersey City's different
cultural and religious celebrations.
ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1448-49 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote and citation
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the law declines to recognize interpretive difficulties. 119 Despite the
language Justice O'Connor uses, then, the "reasonable, informed
observer" is not an attempt to assess actual audience viewpoint at
all. 12° Consistent with the plurality's vision, it is a label for a
judicial determination-based on all the facts and circumstances-of
whether religious endorsement exists as a matter oflaw. This is
confirmed by the fact that, as Justice O'Connor's formulation
suggests, empirical evidence-in the form of surveys and the
like-is not relevant to this inquiry. 121 Thus, in its ultimate
outcome, the "reasonable, informed observer" test yields much the
same result as the Pinette plurality, which would dispense with even
the facial attempt to attribute a view to an observer and simply
decide the endorsement question as a matter of law .122
Why does Justice O'Connor create such a mythical being? In her
view, it is because of the unworkable nature of empirical evidence,

omitted).
119
See Feigenson, supra note 94, at 84 ("To some extent, of course, speaker and audience
must share a context, a sense of what the words may mean; otherwise communication would
not be possible at all. But the contexts may differ, and in that case what the audience
understands is not determined by the words alone, but by something the audience itself
brings to the communicative act: the relations between those words and other things the
audience knows and believes." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 87 (arguing that "objective
observer" standard misrepresents how audiences actually perceive messages); Benjamin I.
Sachs, Case Note, Whose Reasonableness Counts?, 107 YALE L.J. 1523, 1525 (1998)
("[R)eligious symbols are perceived differently by adherents and nonadherents of the religion
associated with the symbol on display.").
120
For example, Professor Kent Greenawalt argues:
Most people who pass by a centrally located public space in a large city
probably will not be aware of the history of the community and forum to
the degree O'Connor assumes for her reasonable person. Thus, it is
entirely possible that most actual people, even most people who would be
reasonable in every other respect, might perceive an endorsement when
Justice O'Connor's reasonable person, aware that the square is open
equally to all private displays, would not.
Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clause, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 372.
121
See Granzeier, 955 F. Supp. at 748 n.l7 ("The court must place itself in the position of
the observer, but need not use polling data or similar materials, because the inquiry is an
'objective inquiry that this court is fully equipped to conduct with the facts at hand.'" (quoting
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (lOth Cir. 1996))).
122
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765 (plurality opinion) (refusing to analyze perceived endorsement
from perspective of"outsiders or individual members of the community uninformed about [the
defendant's] practice").

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 681 2008-2009

682

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:651

the "fundamental difficulty inherent in focusing on actual people. "123
So one might reasonably conclude that the "reasonable, informed
observer" test is one of practicality or convenience-much like
Justice Holmes's reminder that we cannot judge the reasonable man
in tort law by the defendant's own degree of intelligence, lest we end
up with as many degrees of reasonableness as there are people. 124
It might seem, therefore, as if allocating this decision to courts
rather than to the viewers themselves would be contrary to the
notion of autonomy, permitting courts to make certain decisions for
the viewer rather than letting her decide for herself. But it is the
construction of the observer as educated and contextual that, in fact,
connotes that she is free to be persuaded-or not-by the display.
The "reasonable, informed observer" is permitted to engage with far
more communication than an observer treated less autonomously
would be. Except in instances involving actual government
sponsorship, the observer is left to wrestle with and respond to what
she sees. Thus, as with the advocacy cases discussed above, 125 the
religious display cases suggest a view of the First Amendment (tied,
of course, to a different clause) based on the right ofthe recipient of
a persuasive communication to choose-or allow herself-to be
persuaded. In the election cases, the Court held that the
government could not impinge upon this right by assuming that
voters were too gullible; here, the Court holds that the government
may not assume that its citizens are uneducated. In neither set of
cases is the Court concerned with whether either of these
assumptions is true, suggesting that its views are motivated by an
ideal of how government should view individuals and not by the
actual harm suffered in any particular case.
3. New York Times v. Sullivan Yet another source of autonomybased reasoning in the First Amendment cases is found in New York

123

ld. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 108 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881) ("The
law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which
make the internal character of a given act so different in different men .... The law considers,
in other words, what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that.").
125
See supra Part II.B.l.
124
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Times Co. v. Sullivan. 126 In Sullivan, the Court held that a public
official could not sustain a defamation suit brought against the
publishers of an editorial advertisement criticizing performance of
his official duties simply because the material at issue was factually
false. 127 Rather, the official needed to meet a higher standard of
proof by showing that the statement was made "with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 128
As in Mcintyre/ 29 the hero of the Court's opinion in Sullivan is
the speaker: the citizen active in the governance ofhis community,
who may misspeak or get things wrong from time to time, but who
should nonetheless be permitted to speak without the threat of a
libel suit. "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate," the
Court noted, and so "it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the breathing space that they need ... to
survive."130 Indeed, the Court suggested, "[e]ven a false statement
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate,
since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth, produced by its collision with error.' "131 This language, on
its face, indicates a truth theory of the First Amendment, a
description of the political marketplace in which public officials bear
the cost of misstatements.
But, as in Mcintyre, the doctrine's tolerance of false statements
necessarily presumes a listener who is capable of engaging with
them. As long as the process is preserved-here, so long as the false
statement is not made knowingly or with reckless disregard and
thus involves no attempt by the speaker to interfere with the
listener's autonomy-the Court seems relatively unconcerned about

376 u.s. 254 (1964).
ld. at 279-80. Under the Alabama law applied, a publication tending to impute
misconduct to a public official was libelous per se; the burden of proving truth rested with the
defendant. ld. at 267.
128
I d. at 280.
129
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
130
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The First Amendment requires that we protect
some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.~) .
131
Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (quoting JOliN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 15
(Blackwell1947) (1859)).
126

127
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the possible effect such false statements might have on listeners. 132
One possible explanation for this echoes Justice O'Connor's
"reasonable, informed observer": in the realm of political discourse,
the Court assumes that listeners are educated, that statements
about public officials will be understood in context, and that the
listener brings a sense of history to the table. If this were not the
case, we might expect that the Sullivan Court would have
highlighted-if only by noting the harm to the plaintiff-the risk
that the listener might be persuaded by the false statement about
the plaintiff. To the contrary, the Court, quoting its earlier decision
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, declared:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets
of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor.
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader,
as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in
church or state, and even to false statement. But the
people of this nation have ordained in the light of
history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the
citizens of a democracy. 133
Here again, therefore, language that on its face focuses on the
speaker's First Amendment rights implies an objectively
autonomous listener. 134 The risk that the listener may hear

132

See id. at 281 (suggesting that it is responsibility of listeners to debate information
about character and qualifications of public officials (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98
P. 281, 286 (1908))).
133
Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
134
See DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 200 (discussing importance to conception of free speech
that citizens be trusted to hear dangerous and persuasive opinions and be allowed to make
up their own minds). But see David A. Strauss, Principle and Its Perils, 64 U. CHI. L.
REv. 373, 382 (1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra) (arguing that any determination of "how
much breathing room is needed" to ensure open discourse cannot be resolved "simply by
invoking a principle oflistener autonomy" but instead requires "complex, normative empirical
calculations").
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exaggeration or false statements does not justify regulation of the
speech, even if such activity may persuade the listener to adopt the
speaker's view. 135
The same tolerance for persuasive communications underlies the
Court's opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., in which the
Court declined to recognize the existence of an absolute First
Amendment privilege for communications asserted to be opinion by
their speaker. 136 Although it rejected an overly simple distinction
between fact and opinion to distinguish between actionable and
nonactionable speech, the Court held that "a statement on matters
of public concern must be provable as false"-or reasonably imply
false facts-before liability can attach under state defamation law,
regardless of whether the speaker framed his statement with words
connoting an opinion. 137 Thus, the statement that "Joe's Diner has
cockroaches in its kitchen" is likely, if false, to be actionable (as is,
"Joe's Diner, in my opinion, has cockroaches in its kitchen"), while
the statement that "the hamburgers at Joe's Diner are not worth the
five dollars it charges for them" is not. This is so even though the
latter statement may well influence a potential consumer's decision
to eat at Joe's and may do so in a way that results in a consumer
making the "wrong" choice (if the listener-or even a vast majority
of speakers-might conclude that Joe's hamburgers are indeed well
worth the five dollars). Here again, then, the Court restrains the
law from regulating speech merely because it might be persuasive;
the speech must be deemed valueless as a matter of First
Amendment concern before recipients can be prohibited from
receiving it. And as in Mcintyre and Pinette, courts do not rely on
135
Richard Epstein has described this risk in commercial terms. See Richard A. Epstein,
Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 812 (1986) ("The actual
malice rule, in effect, is a rule that the law regards bad information as favorably as good
information so long as it was only produced with gross negligence. It is tantamount to a rule
that a merchant can escape the consequences of selling contaminated goods so long as he did
not mean to hurt his consumers.").
136
497 u.s. 1, 21 (1990).
137
ld. at 19; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."
(footnote omitted)). The Milkovich Court reserved judgment on whether the same rule would
apply to a nonmedia defendant. 497 U.S. at 20 n.6.
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empirical evidence to determine whether a particular statement
implies a false fact; rather, they construct a reasonable reader to
make this determination. 138
Defamation law presumes that those who have heard the
challenged statement are likely to be persuaded, at least some of the
time, that the statement has merit; otherwise, the plaintiffs
reputation would suffer no injury. But Milkovich's constitutional
exclusion of statements that are not fact-based, 139 and Sullivan's
exclusion of even some fact-based statements made without the
requisite state of mind, 140 suggests that this presumption is not
unbounded. Under these cases, there are some statements that
might be made about a plaintiff that might well have the effect of
changing the listener's mind about the plaintiff-either through
purported opinion (Milkovich) or through the false assertion of fact
(Sullivan)-that remain constitutionally protected on the theory
that either more opinion or truthful statements will, through their
juxtaposition with the challenged statements, win out. 141
This faith in the deliberative process, in turn, presumes a listener
with the capacity to hear these statements and decide for herself
whether to believe them. Implicit in the Court's holding in Sullivan
is that the reader has the capacity to assess the truth of a statement
about a public official. If false speech about a public official made
without malice is not actionable, it is the listener, rather than the
courts, who must separate truth from false speech. 142 Like Justice
O'Connor's reasonable observer and Mcintyre's reader of anonymous
138
See David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 81,99-100 (1991) (describing Court's reasonable reader approach); see also
supra note 121 and accompanying text.
139
See 497 U.S. at 21 (finding no constitutional protection for opinion speech).
140
See 376 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that action for defamation against public official
requires actual malice).
141
It is true that the autonomy theory does not, by itself, explain the Gertz Court's
reluctance to extend the same protection to defamation of a private individual. See Redish,
supra note 53, at 644-45 (offering categorical balancing as plausible alternative to selfrealization principle in attempting to explain Court's decision in Gertz).
142
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1585 (2007) ("Sullivan also rests on the
premise that public officials will not suffer unduly as a result of the inevitable false
statement. For this premise to be realized, however, the public must be capable of sorting
through the 'half-truths' and 'misinformation' to glean the foundations of 'enlightened
opinion.' ").
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writings, the recipient of Sullivan-type or Milkovich-type
information is presumed to bring to the interpretive effort
information that can help her judge the value of the message she
has received. The message itself does not give her this information,
and the courts, by declaring that these messages are not actionable,
will not mediate the conversation.
In highlighting the nod to autonomy interests in these various
cases, I do not intend to overstate matters. The listener autonomy
principle is not paramount-or even squarely delineated-in any of
these cases. And I acknowledge, as David Strauss has indicated,
that a listener autonomy principle is not likely to resolve the
complex questions presented by these cases, nor should it. 143 But in
each case, once the channels of communication have been cleared,
the Court has demonstrated a certain level of tolerance for error and
misguided belief through its reluctance to permit governmental
regulation of speech, a tolerance that, I suggest, resonates in an
ascriptive view of the autonomous listener. Critics may suggest that
this view is incompatible with the truth-seeking function of the First
Amendment, in that an autonomy view not only acknowledges the
possibility of error but also anticipates it. But deliberation is a
cumulative process, and it is only through experience that
individuals can develop the skills they need to interpret persuasive
communications. 144 And in any event, the types of communications
at issue in these cases-the wisdom of a government policy, the
adequacy of a religious belief, the assessment of a public official's
conduct-are often considerations that do not admit of truth or
falsity.
143

See Strauss, supra note 134, at 382 (arguing that these complex questions "can be
answered only by making both complex, normative empirical calculations and assessments
of the relative importance of preventing defamation, on the one hand, and allowing robust
speech on the other[, and cannot] be resolved simply by invoking a principle of listener
autonomy").
144
As Rochelle Dreyfuss has suggested, the same interest is present in trademark law.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How
to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAw AND THEORY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 290 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis
eds., 2008) (suggesting that because consumers faced with uncertainty in marketplace "seek
out more information and learn about other considerations that influence purchasing
decisions, .... [a]n approach that cuts off learning imperils competition, blocks the effective
interchange of ideas, and even undercuts the benefits of trademark law").
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At the very least, an autonomy justification is worth considering
even if it cannot be dispositive. And, more to the point, it is curious
that this view is not as prevalent in trademark law, despite
trademark law's focus on the governmental regulation of persuasive
communications, 145 albeit in a commercial setting.

III.

THE LACK OF AUTONOMY IN TRADEMARK LAW

Although First Amendment jurisprudence seems most concerned
with the sellers in this intellectual bazaar, a functioning market
must also have available buyers. It is equally important, therefore,
that First Amendment theories focus on listeners and readers as
much as on speakers. But when the marketplace imagery becomes
less theoretical and more real, First Amendment doctrine shifts.
Commercial speech regulation is subject to a lesser degree of
scrutiny under the First Amendment, primarily because commercial
activity has traditionally been an area of governmental regulation
that is not likely to be chilled by governmental intervention. 146 Yet
even within the Court's modern commercial speech doctrine lurks
a recognition of the importance of treating recipients of information

145
See Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2007) (describing
trademark law as regulating proposals of commercial transactions).
146
For an overview of the Court's current commercial speech analysis, see Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562, 564 n.6 (1980). See also id.
at 566 ("At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."). Commentary on Central Hudson
abounds. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REv. 627, 634-38 (1990) (criticizing purported bases for affording commercial speech
less protection than other forms of speech); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the
First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 779 (1993) (describing dissatisfaction with view that commercial speech should not
receive same degree of constitutional protection as other genres of speech); id. at 783
(contending that view that commercial speech is undeserving of full First Amendment
protection "reflects a bias that is undemocratic and intellectually elitist"); Rebecca Tushnet,
Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 737, 740-41 (2007) (noting
criticism of Court's commercial speech jurisprudence and Central Hudson decision in
particular).
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as capable, autonomous beings, particularly when the governmental
regulation focuses on "the substance of the information
communicated rather than the commercial aspect ofit."147 (Indeed,
a recipient-focused view ofthe First Amendment in the commercial
speech arena obviates the need to decide whether corporations have
speech rights equivalent to those of individuals, since it is the
individual recipients whose interests are at issue.) Here again,
then, we see the Court's two-pronged concern: first, with ensuring
that the channels of communication are free from fraudulent
attempts to interfere with consumer autonomy (for example, by
communicating false facts about a product); and second, with
thereafter allowing consumers to engage with and make choices
based on the information they receive. 148 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia
Pharmacy Board), for example, the Court invalidated the
Commonwealth ofVirginia's ban on the advertising of prescription
drug prices by pharmacists, 149 noting that, far from protecting
consumers, the ban interfered with consumers' autonomy in making
choices for themselves:

147

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A recipient-focused theory of the First
Amendment is not a recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and
Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 29 (1989) (suggesting that
"hearer-centered variant" of First Amendment theory would permit government to
prohibit speech that has no value to autonomous decision making); Redish, supra note 59,
at 446 (acknowledging First Amendment interests oflisteners); cf Tushnet, supra note 146,
at 739-40 ("Recipient-focused theories [of commercial speech doctrine] should allow more
regulation of speech than speaker-focused theories, given that recipient-focused theories do
not consider the commercial speaker to have a distinct autonomy interest in speaking about
its products.").
148
See Neuborne, supra note 147, at25 ("[H]earers have an instrumental first amendment
interest in receiving information that will inform them and/or help them operate systems
based on choice more efficiently and autonomously. Hearers have little or no interest,
though, in receiving demonstrably false or otherwise harmful information."). As Neuborne
points out, there is a risk of "rampant paternalism" in determining whether speech is
categorized as fraudulent, and this tendency:
should be held in check by respect for a hearer's right to make
autonomous choices-even silly ones-so long as the choices are lawful,
and by a healthy skepticism about the capacity of government speech
regulators to be trusted with the power to control information flow even
in the absence of a toleration based speaker.
ld. at 27.
149
425 u.s. 748, 771-72 (1976).
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It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who
wishes to provide low cost, and assertedly low quality,
services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up on
his offer by too many unwitting customers .... They will
respond only to costly and excessive advertising, and end
up paying the price. . . . . All this is not in their best
interests, and all this can be avoided if they are not
permitted to know who is charging what.
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly
paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume
that this information is not in itselfharmful, that people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them. If they are truly open, nothing
prevents the "professional" pharmacist from marketing
his own assertedly superior product, and contrasting it
with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug
retailer. But the choice among these alternative
approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General
Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between
the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers
of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us. 150

In this passage, we see much the same theme as in the cases
previously discussed: 151 the Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment as permitting government regulation only so far as to
"truly open" the "channels of communication"-that is, to regulate
false, misleading, or deceptive speech-but no farther. 152 Once the

160

ld. at 769-70. Although the case predates Central Hudson, there is nothing in the
latter case to suggest that the autonomy interest was disapproved. See also Sullivan, supra
note 60, at 134 ("The Court ... emphasized a kind of autonomy as one driving principle of
Virginia Board-not the autonomy of the speaker to fulfill his rational capacities, but the
autonomy of the listener in making up his own mind.").
161
See supra Part II.B.
162
See Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (noting that First Amendment does
not prohibit state from regulating false or misleading commercial speech).
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government attempts to regulate how individuals interpret
commercial speech or how they make purchasing decisions based on
that speech, its activities are likely to be deemed illegitimate.
In more recent commercial speech cases, the Court's language
has shifted, focusing more on the rights of the corporation as
speaker than on the interests of the consumer. But intimations of
an autonomy interest still exist. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 153 for example, a plurality of the Court reinforced this
concern, even while applying the more deferential Central Hudson
test:
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers
from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will
respond "irrationally" to the truth.
The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what
the government perceives to be their own good. That
teaching applies equally to state attempts to deprive
consumers of accurate information about their chosen
produc t s .... 154
Thus, even in the realm of commercial speech, the Court has
indicated that it is useful to consider whether the purpose of the
governmental regulation at issue is consistent with consumer
autonomy. Regulation that attempts to clear the market of false or
misleading speech enables such autonomy; regulation that attempts
to direct how consumers respond to such speech interferes with
autonomy and is therefore more suspect.155 As Kathleen Sullivan
noted, "what is crucial is not whether we are in the world of

153

517 u.s. 484 (1996).

154

Id. at 503 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 127-28 ("The Court [in 44 Liquormart] would appear

155

to view suppressing commercial speech by reason of its message or communicative impact as
suspicious, even though suppressing commercial speech for other reasons .. . is allowable if
it does not go too far.").
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commercial speech, but what aspects of commercial speech-its
message or its harms-government seeks to regulate."156
Trademark law is, of course, a form of commercial speech
regulation. But, as commentators have noted, current doctrine does
not explicitly incorporate First Amendment values 157 or give
prominence to a positive view of consumer interests. 158 Where First
Amendment issues do arise, the defendant is typically using the
plaintiff's trademark to engage in some sort of expressive activity,
such as parody or commentary. 159 This is not to say, however, that
autonomy interests cannot be used to explain certain existing
aspects of trademark doctrine-namely, those instances in which a
court declines to enjoin the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark
despite evidence (or a presumption) that some consumers will be
confused. 160 In such cases, as in the cases discussed earlier/61 the
result might be justified by viewing consumers as adaptable,
particularly in today's marketplace, and therefore able to be
entrusted with figuring out how to engage with shifting trademark
meanings. 162 For example, when a court declares that a formerly
trademarked term has become generic, it is necessarily assuming
that consumers for whom that term still bears trademark
166

Id. at 128; see also id. at 144 n.81 (citing cases outside commercial speech area in
which "interference with the communicative impact of speech [has) also triggered the Court's
concern").
157
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 146, at 744 (arguing that current trademark doctrine
fails to implement First Amendment norms).
158
See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 11, at 61-62 ("Trademark's traditional seller-conflict
account gives insufficient weight to the interests of nonconfused consumers and their
potential losses ... .").
159
See, e.g., Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002)
(considering use of "Barbie" trademark in pop song).
160
See Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495
(2d Cir. 1989) ("[S)omewhat more risk of confusion is to be tolerated when a trademark holder
seeks to enjoin artistic expression such as a parody .... ").
161
See supra Part II.B.
162
Indeed, some commentators, myself included, have taken the view that consumers are
primarily responsible for the creation and development of trademark meaning. See, e.g.,
ROSEMARY J . COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSIDP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 8 (1998) (attributing meaning of brand to "expressive work of
consumers"); Beebe, supra note 5, at 2021 ("Trademarks exist only to the extent that
consumers perceive them as designations of source. Infringement occurs only to the extent
that consumers perceive one trademark as referring to the source of another."); Heymann,
The Birth of the Authornym, supra note 62, at 1423 (suggesting that trademark's meaning
depends on consumers' interpretation).
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significance will either adopt the new meaning of the term or suffer
from some cognitive dissonance. 163 Similarly, the "descriptive fair
use" provision of the Lanham Act, which permits the use of
another's trademark "otherwise than as a mark" so long as the mark
is "descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe
the [defendant's] goods or services ... or their geographic origin,"164
assumes some level of consumer confusion will be present when a
defendant uses another's trademark in its descriptive sense. 165
Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently articulated, there would be
no need for the defense at all were this not the case. 166
Thus, the existence of the defense indicates some level of
confidence in the consumer. Whatever confusion may exist, it does
not rise to the level at which courts must step in and protect the
consumer-she will inevitably figure out which use of the term is as
a trademark and which use is merely descriptive. And the
touchstone for any trademark infringement case-whether the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark is likely to cause confusion
among the relevant consumer base-itself incorporates a mild
antipaternalism in that it responds only to a certain level of
confusion by the "reasonably prudent consumer," not to every
instance of confusion that a consumer might experience. 167 But in
each of these examples, whatever autonomy interest exists is
passive-if anything, it is a post hoc explanation of the effect of a
court's decision not to grant the trademark holder the relief it seeks.
Absent from the cases is a more positive theory of the consumer,

163

See Grynberg, supra note 11, at 115 ("Declaring a mark generic ... raises the search
costs of consumers who still use the term in question as a trademark.").
164
15 u.s.c. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
165
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004).
166
See id. at 120 ("[l]t would make no sense to give the defendant a defense of showing
affirmatively that the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving [confusion]; all the defendant needs
to do is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded that the plaintiff has carried its own burden on
that point."); see also Tushnet, supra note 146, at 74344 (describing doctrines in trademark
law "designed to separate legitimate from illegitimate sources of misunderstanding").
167
See Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2005)
(describing "reasonably prudent consumer" test); 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 32:188 ("The
lowest reported figure [of confusion] is 8.5 percent, which the court found to be 'strong
evidence' of a likelihood of confusion where other evidence was also strongly supportive.");
Tushnet, supra note 146, at 744 (explaining that courts "discount confusion that results from
pure miscomprehension").
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similar to that found in the First Amendment cases described
earlier, 168 that justifies narrowing the scope of trademark law on the
ground that it restricts consumer autonomy.
How might such a theory operate in practice? We might begin,
as suggested earlier/ 69 by separating the two messages that are
communicated by a trademark: the message that indicates to the
consumer the source of the good or service ("here's what you want")
and the message that embodies the goodwill of the producer ("here's
why you want it"). 170 Having done so, we can align each of these
messages with a type of speech common to First Amendment cases.
The source message is akin to a statement of fact, the falsity of
which constitutes a corruption of the communicative process, and
the goodwill message is akin to a statement of opinion or
persuasion, which relates to the ultimate decision made by the
recipient of the message. When a consumer relies on the first
message, she is making a choice between producers in the
marketplace; when she relies on the second message, she is
contributing-in however small a way-to the course ofher own life
and the identity that she constructs through that choice. To take
one example, a consumer engages with the Coca-Cola trademark in
two ways: first, to ensure that she is buying Coca-Cola and not
Pepsi (the source-identifying function), and second, to constitute
herself as someone who drinks Coca-Cola and not Pepsi at that
particular moment (the persuasion function), whether because of
personal taste, image, perception of corporate practices, or any other
reason. 171 A consideration of consumer autonomy would therefore
counsel that governmental regulation (through trademark law) is
much more appropriate when addressing the former message than
it is when addressing the latter. Thus, as Martin Redish explains,
"if an individual wishes to buy a car because he believes it will make
168

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.
17
° Cf Beebe, supra note 5, at 2025 (defining "search sophistication" and "persuasion
sophistication").
171
Jessica Litman has identified an instance where the trademark becomes mostly a
matter of persuasion: "the effort and expense that goes into distinguishing a Ford Taurus
from a Mercury Sable and persuading customers to buy one rather than the other, when, after
all, they're essentially the same car." Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (1999).
169
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him look masculine," 172 it is difficult, on an autonomy rationale, to
see why the law should restrict that choice, even if we might hope
that the decision rests on a weightier ground. 173 "Recognition of the
individual's unencumbered right to make life-affecting decisions,"
Redish notes, "logically precludes the determination by external
forces that certain grounds upon which to make such decisions are
better than or preferable to others."174
The modern trademark is a far different creation from its earlier
incarnation, when a trademark conveyed only a source-identifying
message, consistent with its origin as a guild marker. 175 With the
development of advertising techniques starting in the 1920s,
trademarks moved from functioning primarily at the point of sale
(i.e., as a heuristic for repeat customers) to having a psychological
effect on consumers well before the consummation of any actual sale
and a lingering effect thereafter. 176 Many who will never own a
172

Redish, supra note 53, at 619.
Id. at 630 (describing effect of autonomy as self-realization on commercial speech
doctrine); see also Neuborne, supra note 147, at 29 ("[T]he toleration based respect for
individual dignity that fuels speaker-centered speech protection should also lead to a refusal
to permit the government to manipulate hearers into 'preferred' choices by controlling the
flow of information to them."); Smolla, supra note 146, at 786 ("In an open society there is
always pressure to believe that money and material will give life meaning. The very
openness, however, that ... encourages advertisers to try to make us all materialists[ 1will
also give free wheel to the intellectual and entrepreneurial imaginations that hold the best
promise for genuinely uplifting our quality oflife. "). But see, e.g., Ronald KL. Collins & David
M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEx. L. REV. 697, 745 (1993) (noting "dissonance
between today's commercial expression and the noble purposes of the First Amendment");
Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants ofDiscontent": An Exploration ofthe Psychology ofAdvertising,
Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATILE U. L. REV. 377, 381 (2001)
(suggesting First Amendment protection of advertising should be reevaluated because
advertising often appeals to addictive impulses).
174
Redish, supra note 53, at 630 n.135. I am not suggesting that a consideration of
autonomy-related interests should eliminate any constitutional protection for commercial
speech whatsoever. Cf, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory
of Freedom, 62 IOWAL. REv. 1, 3 (1976) ("[A] complete denial of first amendment protection
for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment
theory.").
175
See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96
TRADEMARK REP. 943,963 (2006) (describing trademark as serving three possible functions:
"liability" (identifying responsible artisan); "preclusive" (establishing boundaries of guild's
monopoly); or "ownership" (facilitating recovery of goods)); see also id. at 964 (noting shift in
early twentieth century in trademark's function from source signal to quality).
176
See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 761 (1990)
("Successful trademarks are valuable because of the information that they convey. The
consumer sees the mark and knows what the mark represents: a consistent quality, a
173
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Rolls Royce have some sort of perception associated with the mark,
and at least some of those who do own one have a continuing
engagement with the mark each time they drive around town.
Moreover, as earlier noted, trademarks have recently taken on yet
another communicative function: as an element of cultural
discourse. 177 Trademarks are now used as a linguistic shorthand in
addition to an economic one, as a way of describing something more
efficiently or creating a shared discourse through a common cultural
referent. When we hear about something being as difficult as
"nailing Jell-0 to the wall" or refer to something as the "Cadillac of
its class," those of us who are familiar with the product and its
advertising persona understand what the speaker is saying. When
a manufacturer engages in comparative advertising, the trademark
is being used to communicate the meaning of the mark, separate
from its function as an indicator of the source of the good or service.
But none of these uses interferes with the consumer's ability to find
the goods or services she wants.
Even though an element of discourse underlies all of these
personas, focusing only on the rights of speakers-either the
trademark holders or competitors speaking to consumers, or the
consumers unmooring the trademark from its direct connection to
the good and using it to speak to others-seems to miss another
important focus: the rights of consumers as listeners and readers.
As demonstrated by Julie Cohen and Jessica Litman in the
copyright sphere, there is also a role for the consumer to "talk back"
to the trademark directly in its first persona, a role with First
Amendment-type implications. 178 This conversation occurs because

reputation for service, and any of the other things that when wrapped together are thought
of as a business's goodwill.").
177
See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1710-13 (1999) (noting
encroachment of trademark law on social discourse); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 134 (1993) (noting
costs of publicity rights on free expression and cultural pluralism).
178
See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 347, 370 (2005) (describing"situated user" as concerned with "pathways to consumption"
rather than simply "the fact of consumption"); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEx.
L. REv. 1871, 1878 (2007) (calling for increased attention to role of readers and listeners in
copyright law); cf Mad ow, supra note 177, at 134 ("Publicity rights are about .... who gets
to decide what 'Madonna' will mean in our culture: what meaning(s) her image will be used
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trademark law is not-despite the language used by some
commentators 179-about regulating certain words; rather, it is about
protecting certain associations with those words. Under an
infringement rationale, the term "Delta" may be associated with
both an airline and faucets but probably not with an airport shuttle
service or kitchen sinks. Under a dilution rationale, the term
"Kodak" may be associated with film and cameras but not with
pianos.
Trademark law essentially tells consumers which
associations are permissible and which are not. 180
Thus, to the extent we are willing to recognize an autonomy
interest in trademark law-the same autonomy interest underlying
First Amendment cases involving other mental associations and
persuasive communications-we should encourage the same
construction of self-image through choice by exhibiting greater
skepticism of aspects of trademark law that interfere with that
autonomy. 181 This would suggest that trademark law is more
defensible when it is focused on confusing or misleading uses of

to generate and circulate, and what meaning(s) she will have for us.").
179
See, e.g., ROGER SHUY, LINGWSTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 2 (2002)
("[T]rademark law is about the right to monopolize the use of language."); Carter, supra
note 176, at 769 ("Trademark protection matters because it allows a firm to remove a word
from the market language, in the sense that it allows the firm to prevent others from using
the word or anything confusingly similar to it. This creates what might be called language
exclusivity.").
180
The Supreme Court's recent trademark jurisprudence might be read as suggesting, if
not an outright respect for consumer autonomy, at least the notion that consumers are not
in need of as much protection as some trademark holders contend. See, e.g., KP Permanent
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004) ("[T]he common law of
unfair competition ... tolerated some degree of confusion from a descriptive use of words
contained in another person's trademark."); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418, 433 (2003) ("[T]he mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's
mark with a famous mark ... will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to
identify the goods of its owner ...."),superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 207 (2004)
(characterizing Rehnquist Court as viewing "certainty for competitors-rather than
consumers, as one might expect of trademark law"-as important consideration).
181
Cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1087
n.155 (2000) ("If speech is constitutionally protected even if it intends to influence people's
conduct by ... partisan shading of the facts, then it's hard to see why it should become
unprotected just because its recipients plan to use it to influence consumers' buying habits."
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)).
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marks and much less defensible when it is focused on controlling
associations with marks for reasons beyond their confusing or
misleading effects. 182
From a linguistic perspective, trademarks are constructed by the
consumer. Although linguistics recognizes that a certain degree of
shared meaning must exist in order for communications to be
effective, 183 it also incorporates an insight from literary criticism's
reader response theory: the idea that readers have as much control
over meaning as writers. 184 To borrow from Barthian semiotics, 185
trademarks involve both "connotation" and "denotation."
"Denotation," as a system of signification, describes the process by
which the signifier "rock" relates to the signified "a mineral
formation in consolidated form"; "connotation" exists as a second
layer, in which meaning depends on context or social construction,
thus describing the process in which "rock" relates to the signified
"a large diamond, usually on a ring." 186 As Stuart Hall notes,
although communication requires some alignment between the
speaker's desired meaning and the reader's received meaning, the
reader need not accept the desired meaning full stop: he can adjust
the meaning or-in some cases-oppose it altogether. 187 The latter

182
Cf. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 146, at 635 (arguing that advent of modern
advertising dispels Court's assumption in Virginia Pharmacy Board that truth of commercial
speech is more easily verifiable). But see Va. State Bd. ofPharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (suggesting that commercial speech is more easily
verifiable than other types of speech because advertiser presumably knows more about
products or services he provides than others).
183
See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 61, 89 (2006) ("Although every speaker may not define a term identically, for words to
have meaning, the definition must stay within a common boundary when referring to
reality.").
184
See Dave Morley, Text, Readers, Subjects, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE 163, 171
(Stuart Hallet al. eds., 1980) ("The meaning(s) of a text will also be constructed differently
depending on the discourses (knowledges, prejudices, resistances) brought to bear on the text
by the reader.").
185
For an analysis of Roland Barthes's theory distinguishing orders of signification, see
JOHN FISKE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 90-91 (1982).
188
See Stuart Hall, Encoding I Decoding, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE, supra
note 184, at 128, 132-33 (describing and distinguishing between denotation and connotation);
Marina Camargo Heck, The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages, in CULTURE, MEDIA,
LANGUAGE, supra note 184, at 122, 124 (same).
187
See Hall, supra note 186, at 136-38 (discussing three hypothetical positions of viewers
in televisual discourse including "negotiated" and "oppositional" codes).
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case is where what Hall calls "the 'politics of signification'-the
struggle in discourse"-exists. 188
The marketing literature and the practices that it reflects
suggest a similar preference for consumer autonomy in engaging
with the persuasive value oftrademarks. In 1960, Robert J. Keith,
a director of the Pillsbury Company, wrote a short but influential
description of the modern "marketing revolution," suggesting that
"[c]ompanies revolve around the customer, not the other way
around. "189 The company's purpose was no longer to create products
consistent with its available resources, argued Keith, "but to satisfy
the needs and desires, both actual and potential, of our
customers. "190 Modern advertising underwent a similar shift.
Advertisers no longer rely on simply communicating facts about a
product, in the model of the old Sears catalog or the advertisement
for a mercantile shop; 191 now they require consumers to do
interpretive work involving wordplay, metaphor, and cultural
meaning. Indeed, as Linda Scott notes, engaging with advertising
has always been part of literary culture, in the ways in which
consumers read advertisements as well as in the way advertising
transmits culture. 192 Today's advertising often emphasizes subtlety

188

Id. at 138.
Robert J. Keith, The Marketing Revolution, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1960, at 35, 35. More
recent commentators have suggested that the idea of a "revolution" in marketing is a fallacy
and that such consumer-centric notions existed even in what Keith described as the
"production era." I d. at 36; see also, e.g., D.G. Brian Jones & Alan J. Richardson, The Myth
of the Marketing Revolution, 27 J. MACROMARKETING 15, 22 (2007) ("Clear and significant
evidence suggests that ideas and practices characteristic of the sales and marketing eras
existed during the time when a production orientation is commonly believed to have
dominated business practice.").
190
Keith, supra note 189, at 37.
191
See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38
N .M. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2008) (describing shifting focus of twentieth-century advertising from
dissemination of information to appealing to consumers' emotions); Collins & Skover, supra
note 173, at 702--{)3 (identifying shift from "product-information advertising" to "productimage advertising" between 1920s and early 1950s).
192
See Linda M. Scott, Images in Advertising: The Need for a Theory of Visual
Rhetoric, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 252, 261 (1994) [hereinafter Scott, Images in Advertising] ("It
is an important by-product of advertising that a range of art styles are made part of the
common language of the populace."); Linda M. Scott, Spectacular Vernacular: Literacy and
Commercial Culture in the Postmodern Age, 10 INT'L J. RES. MARKETING 251, 261 (1993)
("Advertisements [in newspapers], like other printed matter, were originally read aloud to
groups at home, at work, or in public meeting places like taverns and coffee houses.").
189
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and imagery over direct transmission of factual information,
requiring consumers to engage in interpretive acts similar to those
used with novels or artwork. 193
In order for this shift in control over brand meaning and
interpretation to work, marketers must grant consumers a fair
amount of autonomy in their decision making. This is not to say
that producers do not expend considerable effort and resources in
attempting to influence that decision-indeed, it is precisely because
of the autonomy of consumers that producers must invest such
funds. In the 1950s, a significant critique of advertising suggested
that consumers did not possess a sufficient degree of autonomy to
resist the siren call of advertisers. 194 But more recent examples in
the marketing literature seem to suggest a recognition of-if not a
preference for-autonomy. 195 This autonomy, not surprisingly, is
linked-as it is in the philosophical literature196-to choice and
decision making. 197 This literature recognizes that consumers'
engagement with advertising is part of an ongoing dialogue in which
consumers are not merely passive receptacles for advertising
messages, but-whether consciously or not-accept, respond, or
reject the messages they receive. 198 This seems to be true whether
193
See, e.g., Scott, Images in Advertising, supra note 192, at 265 (discussing cosmetics ad
depicting product submerged in glass of iced water with lime as assuming "an implied viewer
who exercises selectivity, uses experience with the genre of advertising, and engages in
metaphorical thinking").
194
See Brown, supra note 5, at 1182-83 (questioning consumers' freedom of choice); see
also Bartholomew, supra note 191, at 30-31 (noting that several social critics of 1950s and
1960s believed that modern advertising threatened personal autonomy).
195
See, e.g., Ruby Roy Dholakia & Brian Sternthal, Highly Credible Sources: Persuasive
Facilitators or Persuasive Liabilities?, 3 J. CONSUMER RES. 223, 224 (1977) (describing
cognitive response analysis as asserting that "persuasion entails the rehearsal of one's own
attitude-relevant thoughts as well as those contained in a communication"); Marian Friestad
& Peter Wright, The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion
Attempts, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 3 (1994) ("[W]e do not assume that people invariably or
even typically use their persuasion knowledge to resist a persuasion attempt. Rather, their
overriding goal is simply to maintain control over the outcome(s) and thereby achieve
whatever mix of goals is salient to them.").
196
See supra Part II.A.
197
See Avery M. Abernethy & George R. Franke, The Information Content ofAdvertising:
A Meta-Analysis, J. ADVERTISING, Summer 1996, at 1, 1 (noting empirical evidence that
consumers prefer advertising that aids in decision making); Linda M. Scott, The Bridge from
Text to Mind: Adapting Reader-Response Theory to Consumer Research, 21 J. CONSUMER
RES. 461, 476-78 (1994) (advocating reader response approach to consumer research).
198
See Scott, supra note 197, at 464 (" '[R]eading as consumers' means understanding the
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the advertising in question is highly informative or appeals to
emotions; consumers that have become skeptical of informational
claims in advertising may still respond to emotional appeals. 199
A necessary part ofthis process, therefore, is the ability to make
mistakes: to spend money frivolously, to engage in indiscretions, to
assign value to the status of a good rather than to any inherent
difference in quality. Consumers have demonstrated an interest in
identifying themselves as, say, Coke drinkers or Pepsi drinkers, and
in a commercial age this alignment is as much a part of one's
personal development as the decision to vote for a school tax levy or
not. As Sidney J. Levy notes, "the discretionary society might better
be termed the indiscretionary society, since it is often the freedom
to be indiscreet and to indulge one's imprudent choices that makes
the freedom seem real. "20° Consumers learn from this freedom in a
feedback loop-they may purchase the high-end sports car or
handbag and believe that the prestige associated with the
trademark entirely justifies the high price, or they may be
disappointed to discover that they are in much the same station in
life as before (albeit many dollars poorer). 201 Indeed, the law

text as an effort to sell, which in tum implies not only issues of brand awareness or product
attribute beliefs, but also outright skepticism and resistance."); id. at 4 73 (recommending
shift in consumer research from seeing consumer as "a mind whose sole function is to absorb
brand information" to seeing advertisements as "text(s] that the consumer is using to fulfill
a purpose of his or her own"); see also STEPHEN BROWN, POSTMODERN MARKETING 138 (1995)
("Consumers are no longer portrayed as malleable, simple-minded dupes held in marketing's
mendacious thrall, but as astute, discerning, self-aware individuals who enjoy shopping and
identity transformation, are fluent in the language of advertising and revel in the whole
consumption experience, yet at the same time remain capable of ironic detachment, doughty
resistance and subverting rather than succumbing to the machinations of marketing and
multinational capital."). Not every commentator is as sanguine. See, e.g., Janice Winship,
Sexuality for Sale, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE, supra note 184, at 217, 220 (describing
interpretation ofsexually-themed advertisements as involving "contradictory modes in which
we, as readers, are inescapably ensnared in the signification process" (emphasis added)).
199
Carl Obermiller, Eric Spangenberg & Douglas L. MacLachlan, Ad Skepticism: The
Consequences of Disbelief, J. ADVERTISING, Fall2005, at 7, 15.
200
Sidney J. Levy, The Discretionary Society, in BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS &
RESEARCH 319, 323-24 (Dennis W. Rooked., 1999); cf Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property
Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455, 470 (1978) (characterizing libertarian
view of privacy law as believing that suppression of truthful information "is unwarranted,
even if the person who hears it might misuse or misinterpret it").
201
See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcoN. 729, 751 (1974) ("It
does not pay consumers to make very thoughtful decisions about advertising. They can
respond to advertising for the most ridiculous explicit reasons and still do what they would
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supports this kind of learning curve, since it does not seek to
regulate the fantasy or fictional aspects of advertising. A cologne
manufacturer can run a commercial suggesting that wearers of its
product will instantly become attractive to women, or a sportswear
manufacturer can suggest that buying its athletic shoes will
transform a consumer into a professional basketball player, and the
law does not intervene, leaving it to consumers to learn the harsh
reality on their own. 202
Focusing on the reader/consumer as an autonomous being with
First Amendment interests might therefore lead us to reconsider
certain aspects of current trademark doctrine as being either
consistent with or antagonistic to this viewpoint. 203 Cabined
appropriately, trademark infringement doctrine-focusing on
likelihood of confusion-seems aligned with the consumer/reader's
First Amendment interests. Consumers will have difficulty
exercising their autonomy to direct the outcome of their lives if they
are being misled. But modern expansions of the doctrine prove more
problematic. These aspects of trademark law focus on the
persuasive aspects of the mark and not on the informational
aspects; 204 to the extent these aspects can be said to "mislead," it is
only because the law has determined that choices based on these
persuasive aspects would not be beneficial to consumers. An

have done ifthey made the most careful judgments about their behavior.... If it were not in
consumer self-interest to respond to advertising, then consumers' sloppy thinking about
advertising would cost enough that they would reform their ways.").
202
See Litman, supra note 171, at 1729 n. 73 ("If consumers willingly suspend their
disbelief a little because it is pleasant to imagine that eating Snackwell's cookies will make
one thin, [or] that reading Forbes magazine will make one rich, ... perhaps it is a cheap way
for folks to get a little of what they want without actually being fooled-or being fooled
much."); Smolla, supra note 146, at 802-03 (arguing that there is little harm in consumers
fantasizing about such claims and that regulation of such ads is unwarranted); Sullivan,
supra note 60, at 157 ("(M]ost of what Madison Avenue sells is product image. Even under
the existing notion that the government has broad leeway to control misleading commercial
speech, it is not generally claimed that such imagistic associations are deceptive."); cf BeVier,
supra note 25, at 38 (suggesting that courts adjudicating false advertising claims "ought to
interpret ads so that only those representations that present substantial risk of distorting
consumer decisionmaking become predicates for liability").
203
There are, of course, other bases for explaining various expansions of trademark law.
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 2143-80 (discussing sponsorship confusion and trade dress
law).
204
See supra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text.
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autonomy theory of consumers, however, would conclude that
consumers should make this determination on their own.
Consider, first, dilution law. Although dilution doctrine has been
characterized as improperly treating trademarks as property or as
protecting undesirable prestige value, 205 it is also vulnerable from
a consumer autonomy perspective. In a paradigmatic dilution
action, the consumer is not confused as to the source of the
defendant's good or service-she knows, for example, that the maker
of "Kodak pianos" is not affiliated with the camera
manufacturer-but now considers the Kodak mark to be less unique
or distinctive (or, in the case of a tarnishment action, considers the
mark less favorably). 206 Where there was once a single Kodak, the
dilution cause of action sees a thousand, turning what was once
special into something commonplace or disreputable. As a result,
one theory postulates, the consumer takes longer to make the
mental connection between the mark and the product because she
must first mentally discard the other associations with that mark. 207
A trademark owner claiming dilution is therefore saying, as I have
noted elsewhere: "[W]e have spent a lot of money and effort on
telling consumers what they should think about our brand, and the
defendant's activities have caused them to think something
different. "208

205
See Brown, supra note 5, at 1191-94 (describing historical rationale behind dilution
doctrine as protecting mark holder's reputation and ability to expand); Robert N. Klieger,
Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away ofthe Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58
U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 851 (1997) (noting undesirability of bestowing senior mark holders with
property rights in trademarks); Lemley, supra note 177, at 1698-99 (criticizing expansion of
dilution doctrine).
206
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (providing cause of action for dilution of famous marks).
207
See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that
association of mark with variety of unrelated products imposes "higher imagination cost[s]");
Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1148 (2006) ("The idea underlying the concept of
[dilution by] blurring is that the defendant's use of a mark similar or identical to the
plaintiffs mark will 'blur' the link between the plaintiffs mark and the goods or services to
which the plaintiffs mark is traditionally attached."); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEx. L. REV. 507, 519--21 (2008)
("[B]lurring takes place when a single term activates multiple, nonconfusing associations in
a consumer's mind.").
208
Heymann, supra note 7, at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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From a consumer autonomy perspective, it is questionable that
the trademark owner should have control over this association.
Assuming that the consumer encountering "Kodak pianos" is not
engaging with the trademark for its search value-in other words,
she is not using the mark to buy pianos from the same producer
from which she buys film-then she is reacting, if at all, to the
meaning she attributes to the Kodak brand. It might mean that the
association of "Kodak" with "pianos" now takes precedence in her
mind over the association of"Kodak" with "film," or it might mean
that it takes her longer to call up the association of "Kodak" with
"film." But it is only if we believe that the film company has the
right to claim priority in the consumer's mind about what "Kodak"
will mean to her that a dilution action seems defensible. 209 So long
as the consumer is clear about which producer she is dealing with,
autonomy considerations would suggest that she has a right
superior to that of the film company to decide which company she
thinks of first when she hears the term. Indeed, this decision may
well be tied to other aspects of her self-determination, much as
whether the term "Delta" means "airline" or "faucet" to any
particular consumer may depend on whether that consumer
dedicates more time to air travel or to home improvement.
Even if the purported harm consists of what some commentators
have termed a "halo effect"210 (a harm about which other
commentators have conveyed skepticism211 ), the autonomy concern
is the same. To take one example, the name "Rolex" is synonymous
to many consumers with high quality and exclusivity. A bakery that
calls itself the "Rolex Bakery" will probably not confuse consumers
209
Indeed, since dilution protection applies only to marks that are famous, these would
seem to be precisely the kinds of marks that would be capable of surviving such an onslaught.
Beebe, supra note 207, at 1162; Tushnet, supra note 207, at 541-42 ("Fame may preserve the
unidirectionality of associations from a junior brand to a senior by keeping the senior brand's
own associations at the forefront of consumers' minds.").
210
See Swann, supra note 175, at 967 ("Cognitive research establishes that copycat
packaging, even though bearing a clearly distinguishable brand name so as to avoid
confusion ... benefits from a 'halo effect' of a leading brand's packaging."). Trademark
proponents like Swann also argue that this effect, while beneficial for the trademark
defendant, impairs the recall for the trademark plaintiff. Id. at 967-68.
211
See Beebe, supra note 207, at 1164-65 (noting that misappropriation of trademark per
se is not actionable under U.S. law); Tushnet, supra note 207, at 524-25 (discussing doubt
about "free riding" meaning of dilution).
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into thinking that the watchmaker has gone into the baked goods
business, but the bakery might benefit from the associations
surrounding the term "Rolex." The bakery, the argument goes, now
gets to free-ride on Rolex's reputation. It doesn't have to spend time
and effort establishing a reputation for high-quality goods but can
simply use the Rolex name to create that impression in consumers'
minds. And this is true (under the "halo effect" theory) even if the
bakery clearly states that it is not associated in any way with the
watch company. If this is the harm at issue, the theory is one that
especially seems to deny consumer autonomy. As long as the
consumer understands that the Rolex Bakery is not affiliated with
the watchmaker (and in an age of pervasive branding, this may be
open to question212 ), it should be left to the consumer to determine
whether the persuasive effect of the "Rolex" mark is enough to make
her want to patronize the bakery.
As another example ofhow autonomy considerations might affect
doctrine, consider the expansion of traditional trademark
infringement to include additional concepts of"confusion." Even in
the standard infringement suit-where the trademark holder must
show that the defendant's activity has created a likelihood of
confusion as to source among the relevant consumer market--courts
have had a love-hate relationship with consumers: Consumers are
sometimes very savvy about marketing strategies and products, and
sometimes not, in need of assistance and sometimes not, with little
to guide reaction as to when assistance is needed. 213 Although the
marketing literature seems to take account of the interpretive skills
required oftoday's consumer, courts' characterizations of consumers
have used the transformation of the mark from simple source
identifier to more complex transmitter of aura and associations to
opposite effect. Mark Bartholomew suggests that when trademarks
were used more directly to convey information, courts were
correspondingly more trusting of consumers, only recognizing
212
See Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L.
REv. 731, 789 (2003) (suggesting that trademark owners dilute their own marks through
broad uses).
213
See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 723 (2004)
(querying why judges in trademark litigation "so often write about representative members
of the public as if we are astoundingly nai've, stunningly gullible, and frankly stupid").
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confusion that persisted after a "reasonable investigation of the
defendant's product. "214 As trademarks became more numerous and
were communicated to consumers through techniques designed to
persuade as well as to inform, courts (perhaps not surprisingly)
came to view consumers as requiring a higher degree of protection.
Faced with an ever-increasing array of competitors for mindshare,
consumers were thought to select products quickly and with little
forethought. 215
But even in today's market, where trademarks carry multiple
messages, the use of trademark law to regulate the marketplace is
consistent with consumer autonomy, since without such regulation
consumers would not be able to obtain the products they want
without considerable investigation as to the qualities of those
products. 216 In this respect, trademark law parallels the First
Amendment cases in that it works to clear the market of fraudulent
efforts to interfere with autonomy. 217 Consistent with the Kantian
view that individual autonomy is to be respected by government
only so long as it does not interfere with the autonomy rights of
others, 218 trademark law is well within its bounds to ensure that
producers do not engender confusion among their consumers by
sending misleading signals about the source of their product,
whether intentionally or unintentionally.
But other theories of infringement do not map as well onto these
concerns. Consider the common practice of a producer using
packaging similar to a competitor's trade dress in order to convey to
consumers that the products are comparable. The store-brand

214

Bartholomew, supra note 191, at 7. Bartholomew cites several examples, including
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877), in which the Court required "careful inspection
to distinguish the spurious trade-mark from the genuine" in order to maintain a cause of
action, and Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co., 122 F. 796,798 (8th Cir. 1903), in which
the circuit court required reasonable examination of packaging.
215
Bartholomew, supra note 191, at 10 ("While the Victorian-era consumer was expected
to exercise some caution in the commercial world, the early 1900s consumer was 'apt to act
quickly, and [was) therefore not expected to exercise a high degree of caution.' " (alteration
in original) (citing Paris Med. Co. v. W.H. Hill Co., 102 F. 148, 151 (6th Cir. 1900))).
216
See Bone, supra note 15, at 2117-18 (characterizing trademark law as protecting
against source-identifying word marks, direct competitors, and source confusion at point of
purchase).
217
See discussion supra Part II.B.
218
Wells, supra note 54, at 167.
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shampoo, laundry detergent, or garbage bags are likely to be
packaged in bottles or boxes that closely resemble those of the
name-brand products to indicate to consumers the equivalence in
their formulas or materials. As several commentators have noted,
the likelihood of confusion in such situations is low. 219 The storebrand product is almost certainly placed on the shelf next to the
name-brand product (the geographic proximity serving as both a
communication and a convenience), giving the consumer a ready
opportunity to differentiate between the two products. 220 More
important, as long as the store-brand product is marked with the
name of the store, the consumer is not likely to use the trade dress
in order to identify a producer; rather, she will interpret it as an
attempt to persuade her that she will be just as happy with the
lower-priced store brand as with the name-brand product. Thus,
consideration of her autonomy interest would counsel a finding of
infringement (or false advertising) only when the defendant has
made a false statement (e.g., claiming it is the name brand or
claiming it is the identical formulation when it is not) but not when
the trade dress is used merely for its persuasive effect. 221
Autonomy interests might also cause courts to think differently
about cases involving theories of confusion as to authorization or
endorsement. The merchandising cases are typical examples of such
theories, where courts find a likelihood of confusion when a
defendant puts the plaintiffs logo (such as a sports team or college
logo) on a hat or T-shirt without authorization. 222 The argument is
219
See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 213, at 766 ("[A]ny question about whether consumers can
tell the difference between [store-brand and name-brand products] can usually be
straightforwardly answered as follows: Of course they can.").
22il See McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d
Cir. 2007) ("Consumers are generally aware of the name of the store in which they are
shopping. They are aware that stores have private-label brands that in most cases are
merchandised next to the national-brand products. Prices for the products are typically
displayed prominently. Consumers can, therefore, see the cost difference between store
brands and national brands.").
221
Rochelle Dreyfuss has advocated approaching this distinction through a multifaceted
concept of trademark use. See Dreyfuss, supra note 144, at 270 ("[U]se [of a trademark] to
persuade (through, for example, comparative ads and gripe sites) . . . [should] not be
considered the type of use with which trademark law is concerned.").
222
Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 510
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) is the paradigmatic case. See also, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18
I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998) ("For a party to suggest to the public, through its use
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that the presence of the logo conveys to consumers the false message
that the entity affiliated with the logo has authorized the
appearance ofthe logo on the defendant's product, even though the
entity likely had no other involvement with the production of the
good. 223 In this sense, the logo functions in the same way as a
celebrity endorsement: a familiar face who lends his authority to
the product and persuades the consumer to select it, thus creating
a transfer of meaning flowing from the endorser and through the
goods to the consumer. 224
But even assuming this is descriptively correct, it is unclear why
trademark law should have much work to do here. Even if the
consumer views the presence of the logo as a signal of endorsement,

of another's mark or a similar mark, that it has received permission to use the mark on its
goods or services suggests approval, and even endorsement, of the party's product or service
and is a kind of confusion the Lanham Act prohibits."); Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v.
Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 n.28 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[l)n our view, most consumers who
purchase products containing the name or emblem of their favorite school or sports team
would prefer an officially sponsored or licensed product to an identical non-licensed product.
Were this not true, the word 'official' would not appear in so many advertisements for such
products."); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979) ("In order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that
the owner of the mark actually produced the item and placed it on the market. The public's
belief that the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark
satisfies the confusion requirement." (citations omitted)).
223
As James Gibson, among others, has noted, the fuzziness ofthe terminology is reflected
in the legal analysis. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 910-11 (2007) ("[A] s courts employ a variety of decreasingly
analogous synonyms for sponsorship and approval, the focus shifts from whether the plaintiff
sponsored or approved of the defendant's product to whether the plaintiff acquiesced in the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark."). Indeed, given the prevalence of product placements
in film and television programs, consumers might be forgiven for thinking that the entity
affiliated with the logo paid the apparel manufacturer for the placement of the logo rather
than the reverse.
224
See Grant McCracken, Who Is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of the
Endorsement Process, 16 J. CONSUMER REs. 310, 314 (1989) ("Consumers must take
possession ofthese meanings and put them to work in the construction of their notions of the
self and the world."). McCracken asserts that this effort is due, at least in part, to a
breakdown in traditional social structures that have obviated the need for individual selfdetermination. See id. at 318 ("[l]ndividualism and alienation have conspired to give
individuals new freedom to define matters of gender, class, age, personality, and lifestyle.
The freedom to choose is now also an obligation to decide ... .");see also Madow, supra
note 177, at 142-43 ("Indeed, it is only because celebrity images carry and provoke meaning
that they can enhance the marketability of the commodities with which they are associated.
Their 'associative' or 'publicity' value derives from their semiotic power." (footnote omitted)).
This is true, as Madow notes, whether the celebrity image that is involved is the ector herself
or the character she plays. I d. at 199 n.350.
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she is not engaging with the mark in its source-identifying sense.
In other words, she is probably not using the mark to glean
anything about the qualities of the apparel to which the logo is
affixed. 225 Rather, she is engaging with the persuasive aspect of the
mark. As with the celebrity endorser, the logo is conveying the
message that it is in some way preferable to buy the branded
product-that aT-shirt with a Boston Red Sox logo is a "better" Tshirt than one without the logo. This is not because the logo
communicates source-that is, that the Red Sox produce highquality T-shirts-but because the logo itself is of(expressive) value.
Consumers who purchase a branded T -shirt want to be like other
purchasers (if only insofar as they enjoy the same sports team), just
like consumers who respond to a celebrity endorsement want, in
some small way, to be like the celebrity (if only insofar as they enjoy
the same product). Once again, considerations of consumer
autonomy would leave it to the consumer to decide whether this is
a legitimate assertion. There is little qualitative difference for
autonomy purposes among these statements: "The hamburgers at
Joe's Diner are not worth the five dollars it charges for them"; "Tiger
Woods thinks that you should buy this razor"; and "This is a more
desirable T-shirt because it has a Red Sox logo on it." Each
statement depends on the persuasiveness of the speaker for effect,
and so each remains the domain of the consumer to regulate, even
if we might characterize his choice to believe any of these assertions
as foolish. 226

225

It is possible that the consumer believes that the trademark owner would license its
mark for use only on high-quality goods, but I suspect this is unlikely. In any event, the
consumer can assess many of these qualities for herself through inspection.
226
Ellen Goodman notes how this operates in the commercial news media:
The agenda of the commercial media, assuming nothing but a profit
motive, is to attract audience attention. In offering content on this basis,
the editor makes a validity claim combining truth and sincerity. She says,
in effect, "You like this communication,~ or "I think you will like it.~ The
same cannot be said for the sponsor. The sponsor seeks not to please the
audience with its communication, but to use communication to induce
action. An editor speaking a sponsor's promotional message and
advancing the sponsor's agenda cannot redeem a claim to either sincerity
or truth.
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEx. L. REv. 83, 119 (2006).
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Trademark law, by contrast, is better left to ensuring the absence
of false statements of fact. As long as the defendant has not falsely
suggested authorization, 227 any further use of a mark of the type
discussed here should be permissible. And to the extent the
consumer is simply seeking out the mark for its pure communicative
function-to signal affiliation with the team or school it
represents-then autonomy has an even greater role to play and
trademark law a lesser one. In this scenario, the use of the
trademark by the consumer is at the core of identity formation. She
is purchasing the good because she accepts whatever meaning is
conveyed by the mark apart from its indication of the quality of the
good. 228
Another expansion of what constitutes "confusion," which might
be rethought with the infusion of autonomy concerns, is the doctrine
of initial interest confusion. In the typical initial interest confusion
case, the defendant "improperly uses a trademark to create initial
customer interest in a product, even if the customer realizes, prior
to purchase, that the product was not actually manufactured by the
trademark-holder."229 For example, in a dispute between Mobil

w Following Mcintyre , true ascriptive autonomy may not even require a statement as to
authorization. See discussion supra Part II.B. I . To the extent that the consumer believes the
assertion that aT-shirt bearing a Red Sox logo is somehow "better" than a plainT-shirt, it
should not matter who is making that assertion. Cf. Goodman, supra note 226, at 87-88
(arguing that regulation of undisclosed sponsor marketing is necessary because consumers
are not equipped to sort out competing claims on their own). However, as in Pinette, courts
may deem the autonomous consumer to be someone who "would certainly be able to read and
understand an adequate disclaimer." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 782 (1995) (O'Connor, J ., concurring). In addition, consumers may want to ensure
that their money goes to the trademark holder and not to another entity, in which case a
statement or disclaimer as to authorization may be important.
228
See, e.g., Int1 Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F .2d 912, 918 (9th
Cir. 1980) ("We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing allegiances.
Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the organizations
we belong to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports teams we
support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently include names and
emblems that are also used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive to conclude
that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product somehow
originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem signifies."). But
see, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1049 (3d Cir. 1982)
("[W]hatever the ultimate scope of protection afforded, the crucial element is consumer desire
to associate with the entity whose imprint is reproduced. This desire is based on success or
notoriety which, in turn, is a result of the efforts of that entity.").
229
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F .3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Oil-which uses a flying horse as its logo-and a company called
Pegasus Petroleum, the Second Circuit found it relevant to the
confusion determination that even though third parties would
ultimately know which party they were dealing with by the time a
sale was concluded, "Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial
credibility during the initial phases of a deal .... because of the
possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil."230
As with the comparative trade dress example discussed earlier, 231
autonomy considerations help distinguish uses that are properly the
province of trademark law from those that are for the consumer to
negotiate. To the extent the defendant is using the mark for its
source-identifying function (e.g., to tell the customer that the
plaintiff's product is available when it is not), this use interferes
with consumer autonomy much as do false or misleading facts and
is thus properly regulated by trademark law. 232 But to the extent
that the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark for its persuasive
valu~ither as a lure to attract consumers, with the hope that the
consumers will, once attracted, choose the defendant's product
instead, or to provide relevant information about the plaintiff (e.g.,
a trademark used as a keyword in a search engine)-that use seems
consistent with the consumer's autonomy interest. When the mark
is used for persuasion, the consumer is not being misled by the
defendant's activity since the plaintiff's product is available. She is
therefore merely deciding whether the goodwill bound up in the
plaintiff's mark is persuasive enough to lure her in and keep her
attention. For example, a supermarket that advertises "Icy Cold
Coca-Cola Inside!" when all that is offered is the store-brand cola
230

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
232
The FTC also characterizes this activity (the classic bait-and-switch) as an unfair trade
practice. See 16 C.F.R. § 424.1 (2008) (deeming it unfair trade practice for retail food store
"to offer any [grocery] products for sale at a stated price, by means of an advertisement
disseminated in an area served by any stores which are covered by the advertisement, if those
stores do not have the advertised products in stock and readily available to customers during
the effective period of the advertisement, unless the advertisement clearly and adequately
discloses that supplies of the advertised products are limited or the advertised products are
available only at some outlets"); id. § 424.2 (finding no violation if"[t]he advertised products
were ordered in adequate time for delivery in quantities sufficient to meet reasonably
anticipated demand," or retailer offers raincheck, similar product at comparable price
reduction, or other compensation).
231
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(with the hope that consumers, once inside, will take a second-best
offering to avoid having to renew their search) is autonomyinterfering; a supermarket that places the same sign outside when
both Coca-Cola and the store-brand cola are offered (with the hope
that consumers, once inside, will decide they prefer the cheaper soft
drink) is autonomy-enhancing. 233 Transferring this example to the
online search engine context yields the same result: The use of a
trademark to trigger a list of search results that includes not only
the trademark owner's site but also other sites that may be of
interest to the consumer is consistent with autonomous choice and
thus should be outside the reach of trademark law. 234
Thus, in each of these areas of trademark law, a consideration of
the consumer's First Amendment-based autonomy interests can
help determine the appropriate role of trademark law. Where the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark is the equivalent of a false
statement of fact-relying on the source-identifying aspects of the
mark-trademark law's role is properly robust. But where the
defendant is exploiting the persuasive aspects of the plaintiffs mark
(the aspect ofthe mark that attempts to tell the consumer why the
product is desirable), vigorously applied trademark law will deprive
the consumer of the ability to engage with the mark on her own
terms, to make her own associations with the mark, and to decide
for herself whether she believes the message of quality, status, or
prestige that the mark is conveying.
It is true that autonomy is not without its costs. AB David
Strauss notes, a theory that gives us a general principle of
permissible government interference may not be helpful in resolving

233
It is, of course, a common practice for merchants to advertise a name-brand good for
sale (often at a highly reduced price), hoping that consumers will fill their carts with
additional merchandise once inside. See, e.g., Rajiv Lai & Carmen Matutes, Retail Pricing
and Advertising Strategies, 67 J. Bus. 345, 346 (1994) (noting role of advertising as a
"commitment device" and that "loss leaders do attract consumers into the store even if they
are rational and expect to pay very high prices for unadvertised goods").
234
Judge Berzon's concurrence in Playboy Enterprises International, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., a keyed Internet advertisement case, speaks to this point. See 354
F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) ("There is a big difference between
hijacking a customer to another website by making the customer think he or she is visiting
the trademark holder's website (even if only briefly) ... and just distracting a potential
customer with another choice, when it is clear that it is a choice.").
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any particular case because it takes too "thin" a view of how
individuals reason in any particular situation. 235 Consumers are not
always capable of making rational judgments about how to engage
with trademarks in the marketplace, and so, by definition, an
ascriptive view of the consumer holds some consumers to a higher
standard than they can meet in practice. As a result, some
consumers will experience higher psychic and economic costs of
participation in the marketplace. This is particularly incongruous
for an area of the law that relies heavily on surveys to determine
consumer reaction to trademarks, and so purports to care at least
somewhat about what individuals actually think. 236 But the law is
no stranger to this phenomenon, as the First Amendment cases and
tort law's "reasonable person" standard demonstrate. 237 And
trademark law is no exception, given that not all confusion can be
remedied. Today's consumers have an increasing number of ways
to research products before they buy them, along with multiple
avenues for expressing their opinions about their experiences with
the products. 238 There is therefore nothing inherently wrong with
the law reflecting an expectation that consumers will avail
themselves of these opportunities; indeed, there can be a benefit to
the law's setting norms rather than merely reflecting them, so long
as we believe those norms rest on appropriate foundations. 239 As
235

Strauss, supra note 55, at 370.
See Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases:
A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 747 (2000) ("[S)urvey evidence
has become de rigueur in trademark infringement cases.").
237
See supra Part II.B.
236
See, e.g., Rob Walker, The Brand Underground, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 29, 31 ("It is often said that this generation of teenagers and 20-somethings
is the most savvy one ever in its ability to critique and understand commercial persuasion,
and it is probably true -just as it was true when the same thing was said of Generation X
and of the baby boomers before that."). See generally Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth
and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 144, at 404 (discussing effect of online reviews and
"online word of mouth" on consumer perceptions).
239
See Beebe, supra note 5, at 2068 ("As currently understood, trademark law is a
primarily descriptive enterprise, one which seeks simply to insure that market information
is accurately conveyed and comprehended.... The law commands that courts assess whether
or not consumers are actually confused, not whether or not they should be confused."); Stacey
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54
EMORY L.J. 461, 487 (2005) ("The real underlying issue is whether the trademark law should
act ... as a creator or as a reflector of societal norms.").
236
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Julie Cohen theorized, albeit in a different context: "Autonomous
individuals do not spring full-blown from the womb. We must learn
to process information and to draw our own conclusions about the
world around us. We must learn to choose, and must learn
something before we can choose anything. "240 Allowing the
consumer to engage with trademarks' various associations without
interference from trademark law is a necessary part of this learning
process.
As with the discussion ofthe First Amendment cases above, 241 my
goal here is modest. It is not to suggest that consideration of the
consumer as an autonomous being answers every trademark
question, that the autonomy interest is as robust as in the First
Amendment cases, 242 or even that the autonomy interest might not
be outweighed by other, more important interests. Rather, my goal
is to demonstrate that consumer autonomy has been an
underappreciated interest to date and that trademark doctrine
would do well to recognize it.
IV. CONCLUSION

In many areas of intellectual property law, commentators have
identified the importance of focusing on the recipients of
information-readers, viewers, and listeners-as equal to speakers
in their role as participants in the making of meaning. 243 The

:uo Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1424 (2000) (advocating"zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny
and interference" (i.e., data privacy) to allow development of autonomy).
241
See supra Part II.B.
242
Cf. Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 1517, 1526 (1997) (reviewing FISS, supra note 51, and distinguishing "democratic
citizens" from consumers on ground that democratic citizens actively participate in agendasetting and framing issues for decision).
243
See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 5, at 2059 (describing cultural populist commentary in
trademark law as "committed to the view that the consumer is active and critical, both in
search and preference formation"); Litman, supra note 178, at 1910 (noting that interaction
with copyrighted works is important right of readers); Madow, supra note 177, at 139
(describing "cultural populist" conception of popular culture as view that consumers "neither
uniformly receive nor uncritically accept the 'preferred meanings' that are generated and
circulated by the culture industry" (footnote omitted)); cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
Summum, No. 07-665, slip op. at 12 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2009) ("Even when a monument features
the written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be

HeinOnline -- 43 Ga. L. Rev. 714 2008-2009

2009]

THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN IN TRADEMARK LAW

715

consumer is not simply someone with the ability to repurpose speech
but is also someone who contributes to determining first purposes.
The attention commentators have paid in recent years to the
importance of the public domain in copyright law is borne of a
recognition ofthe value of allowing consumers of creative expression
to develop meaning and construct their identities.
This
engagement, in trademark law as in the other fields, is a critical
part of personal development. Our choices as to what we read,
listen to, and purchase help to create our identities, define ourselves
to the world, and develop our critical faculties. 244 In this respect,
trademark law is no less worthy a candidate for a First Amendment
theory of the consumer than is copyright law, religious observance,
or political speech.

interpreted by observers, in a variety of ways.").
244
Cf. Brown, supra note 5, at 1198 ("In trade symbol cases, the unwary purchaser is
scarcely a worthy object for judicial solicitude. . . . The figure of the unwary, casual,
incautious, unsuspecting purchaser suggests conclusions which those who favor him could
scarcely confess: that people are not very bright, and that a good deal of persuasion cancels
out, leaving consumers (bright or not) indifferent as to either origin or advertising of many
goods." (footnote omitted)); Dreyfuss, supra note 144, at 292 ("[D]esigning [trademark] law
to protect the reasonable consumer would encourage individuals to develop their facilities.");
Redish, supra note 59, at 439 ("illfthe individual's intellectual growth is dependent upon an
opportunity to participate actively in decisions that significantly affect him, what decisions
affect him more directly than those which he must make concerning matters within the
private sector of his life?"); Smolla, supra note 146, at 786 ("In an open society there is always
pressure to believe that money and material will give life meaning.... The very openness,
however, that ... encourages advertisers to try to make us all materialists[] will also give
free wheel to the intellectual and entrepreneurial imaginations that hold the best promise for
genuinely uplifting our quality of life.").
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